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Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting 
the Dualism of Legal Worker Identities 
V.B. Dubal 
Today, whether a worker is legally classified as an “employee” or 
an “independent contractor” determines whether he or she is entitled 
to employment and labor law protections. With the proliferation of 
the on-demand economy, the doctrinal definitions and legal analyses 
of these categories are fiercely contested. While businesses have 
attempted to confine the definition of employee to limit their financial 
and legal liabilities and risks, public interest lawyers have worked to 
broaden the definition, ensuring that more workers are covered and 
protected by the law. How did U.S. law come to divide workers into 
these two categories, how have the definitions evolved historically, 
and how do workers today make sense of them? This Article 
challenges the duality of worker classification in employment 
regulation by positioning the employee and the independent 
contractor in U.S. legal history and in the lives of contemporary 
workers. Part I situates the debate in work law scholarship. Part II 
uses historical and legal archives to challenge the prevailing 
assumptions about the employee and independent contractor 
classifications in employment and labor law. I argue that the 
existence of the dualism of worker categories is more recent than 
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previously understood and that contemporary doctrinal tests reflect 
not bright line legal rules, but evolving political and cultural 
philosophies about work. Part III investigates the impact of these 
legal classifications on the ground. Through ethnographic research 
and analysis, I find that these categories of work have taken on social 
meaning for workers, often disrupting worker collectivities. The 
Article concludes that both the doctrinal analyses of the employee 
category and the lawyering methodologies used to advance the 
interests of workers must be more attendant to workers’ realities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the decline of the welfare state in the United States, a tremendous 
amount of weight has been placed on employment regulation to remedy 
economic inequality. And yet, paradoxically, employment aid and employment 
benefits elude many U.S. workers. A growing number of workers are not 
considered “employees” under the law but “independent contractors,” working-
class entrepreneurs who are ineligible for basic employment safeguards such as 
the right to collectively bargain, the right to a minimum wage, and the right to 
protections against employment discrimination, among others. With the 
innovation and proliferation of business models intended to lower corporate 
costs by relying on non-legally cognizable employee labor, especially in the 
“on-demand” or “gig” economy, more workers are working “casually.”1 Such 
nonemployee workers include contractors, lessees, temporary laborers, 
freelancers, and consultants, all likely classified as “independent contractors.” 
Social scientists refer to the growth of the casual workforce as the rise in the 
precariat––a class of workers whose relationship to employment is precarious 
or risky because it lacks stability and the benefits of regulation.2 
This Article maintains that the legal bifurcation of workers into 
“employees” and “independent contractors” has contributed significantly to the 
growth of precarious work in the United States. It investigates the legal, 
historical, and cultural origins of these dual legal categories and their impact on 
contemporary workers. Based on empirical research, I argue that the two-
category division of workers in U.S. employment and labor laws is much more 
recent than commonly understood. This division has resulted not just in 
widespread contingent labor but also in fractured worker collectivities, thereby 
exacerbating the potential for precarity. These findings highlight the need for 
more scholarly attention to the politics of employee rights advocacy. 
Simultaneously, they hold key implications for doctrinal analysis and for 
lawyering methodologies intended to address the rise of insecure work, 
poverty, and inequality in the United States.3 
 
 1. The “on-demand” or “gig” economy consists of firms that employ independent contractor 
labor for mostly short-term work engagements. These workers labor “casually” without a long-term 
employment relationship to a single employer. Another term for casual labor is contingent work. 
Casual or contingent workers are considered disposable and frequently work part-time. According to 
Jennifer Middelton, “Perhaps the largest segment of the contingent workforce is the part-time working 
poor.” Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or 
Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557, 558 (1996). 
 2. See, e.g., Arne L. Kalleberg, Precarious Work, Insecure Workers: Employment Relations 
in Transition, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 2 (2009); GUY STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW 
DANGEROUS CLASS 7–13 (2011); ANDREW ROSS, NICE WORK IF YOU CAN GET IT: LIFE AND LABOR 
IN PRECARIOUS TIMES (2009). 
 3. The official poverty rate increased from 12.5 percent in 2007 to 15.0 percent in 2012. 
STANFORD CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQUALITY, NATIONAL REPORT CARD 1, 4 (2014). According to 
researchers at Stanford University:  
After the Great Recession ended in mid-2009, income and consumption inequality 
increased, thus resuming what has been a nearly relentless growth in inequality over the last 
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This Article is informed by legal and historical research spanning 1910 to 
2013 and by ethnographic data collected in the San Francisco taxi-worker 
community between 2010 and 2013.4 The legal and historical research includes 
a comprehensive review of a century of federal court decisions, federal 
legislative history, law review articles examining the employee and 
independent contractor dualism, and over one hundred years of newspaper 
archives relating to the taxi industry collected by United Taxicab Workers of 
San Francisco, the San Francisco Public Library, and the San Francisco State 
University Labor Archives.5 The ethnographic data, collected over a span of 
more than two years, incorporates over one thousand hours of participant 
observation at regulatory meetings, taxi worker advocacy meetings, and other 
places where taxi workers frequently convene, like the San Francisco 
International Airport holding lot. This research also comprises data from forty-
five in-depth interviews of taxi workers. 
Taxi work is an especially telling site for this investigation into the 
historic origins and contemporary legal and social meanings of the dual worker 
categories of employee and independent contractor. Today, “ride-sharing” (as 
the next-generation of taxi work) leads the technologically driven “platform” or 
gig economy with its legally contested use of independent contractor drivers.6 
Ironically, over forty years ago, in the late 1960s and 1970s, taxi companies 
were among the first businesses nationwide to alter their business models by 
changing the legal identities of their workers from employees to independent 
contractors. While the nature of taxi work remained the same, taxi companies 
restructured their relationship to workers, demanding that the workers “lease” 
the taxis from companies, as opposed to split their fares with the taxi 
companies. This change to leasing, the companies maintained, gave the 
 
thirty years. The lowest income quintile secured only 3.4 percent of total income in 2012. 
In the 1990s, it appeared as if the long-standing decline in the lowest quintile’s share had 
been staunched, but that downward march has now resumed.  
Id. at 6. 
 4. Newspaper reports confirm the first taxi worker strike in San Francisco in 1910. Taxicab 
Drivers Are out on Strike, S.F. CALL, Nov. 1910 (on file with author). Exactly one hundred years later, 
in 2010, I began two years of ethnographic research on taxi workers and the taxi worker collectivities 
in San Francisco. 
 5. The United Taxicab Workers, which was the longest running post-union taxi-worker 
advocacy group in San Francisco, maintained an archive of newsletters and other ephemera affiliated 
with their advocacy and the advocacy of their predecessor, the Alliance of Taxicab Workers. They 
kindly shared it with me. The Daniel E. Koshland San Francisco History Center (Center) located in the 
San Francisco Public Library contains a research collection of books, newspapers and magazines, 
photographs, maps, posters, archives and manuscript collections, and ephemera documenting all 
aspects of San Francisco life and history. The Center also houses the archives for the City and County 
of San Francisco. Finally, the San Francisco State Labor Archives has a small collection of taxi-
worker-related material, mostly donated by the family of S.T. Dixon, an early twentieth century 
chauffeur organizer. 
 6. At the time of publication, active misclassification lawsuits against Uber and Lyft abound. 
In the state of California, seventeen such cases had been filed, at least one of which was a class action 
lawsuit. 
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workers more control over their work and thus made them legally cognizable 
independent contractors. As a result of this industry-wide shift, many of the 
earliest legal decisions adjudicating the dual worker categories for the purposes 
of employment protections involved an investigation into the work of the taxi 
industry.7 
The San Francisco taxi industry, in particular, serves as a revealing case 
study and window into the implications of the dual worker categories on the 
ground. First, the history of the city poses an interesting puzzle: from 2002 to 
2009, by municipal regulation, San Francisco taxi workers could have been 
converted to employee status if a simple majority of the workforce wanted the 
shift.8 Despite the instability and risks associated with independent contractor 
labor, this change never happened. Second, the San Francisco taxi workforce is 
more diverse than the taxi workforce in other major metropolitan areas. While 
the industry is largely immigrant, the drivers have comparably diverse national 
origins, and the city still maintains a large contingent of white, nonmigrant taxi 
workers. My ethnographic research reflects a multiplicity of viewpoints that, I 
maintain, are associated with this diversity of the worker population. Finally, 
San Francisco is home to the latest in taxi business re-orderings through the 
recent advent of ride-sharing. Since 2012, the ride-sharing or “transportation 
network” industry has converted many independent contractor taxi workers to 
independent contractor “micro-entrepreneurs” with even fewer employment 
protections than traditional San Francisco taxi drivers.9 Indeed, the most recent 
and highly publicized misclassification battles take place in this industry and 
are being litigated on behalf of San Francisco drivers (as well as other Uber 
drivers throughout the state of California).10 
 
 7. See, e.g., Party Cab Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1949). 
 8. This option was eliminated when the San Francisco Board of Supervisors dissolved the 
Taxi Commission and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA) took over 
regulation of the taxi industry and rewrote the industry’s governing regulations. 
 9. Some scholars use the term “micro-entrepreneur” to reference workers in the so-called 
“sharing economy.” See, e.g., The New Sharing Economy Can Enrich Micro-entrepreneurs But At 
What Cost?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/sharing-economy-
enrich-micro-entrepreneurs-promote-unregulated-big-business [https://perma.cc/7JU2-KVDF] 
(interview comment by Arun Sundarajjan). Unlike ride-share drivers working for companies like Uber 
and Lyft, San Francisco taxi workers are covered by workers’ compensation and unemployment 
insurance laws as a result of misclassification litigation. Tracy v. Yellow Cab Cooperative, No. 
938786 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1996) (order granting summary judgment). 
 10. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-03826 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016). 
O’Connor, a certified class action, has received a tremendous amount of attention for its potential to 
make Uber’s drivers employees and to upend Uber’s business model and, by extension, the business 
model for many companies in the on-demand economy. See, e.g., Lauren Weber & Rachel Silverman, 
Meet the Boston Lawyer Who’s Putting Uber on Trial, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-the-boston-lawyer-whos-putting-uber-on-trial-1446596980 
[https://perma.cc/9LEY-NTS7]; Therese Poletti, The Lawyer Looking to Kill the “Gig Economy,” 
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-lawyer-looking-to-kill-the-
gig-economy-2015-12-07 [https://perma.cc/VPR8-KJ7M]; Julia Carrie Wong, Original Uber Plaintiff 
Says He Agreed to ‘Disastrous’ $100m Deal ‘Under Duress,’ GUARDIAN (May 16, 2016), 
70 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  105:65 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly reviews the 
contemporary legal literature on the employee and independent contractor 
categories and the doctrinal debates within that body of scholarship. With this 
as background, Part II utilizes original legal and historical research to answer 
the following question: When and how did workers become categorized into 
employees and independent contractors for the purposes of employment 
regulation, specifically the right to collectively bargain? In sharp contrast to 
the assumptions made in existing scholarship on worker categories, my 
research shows that the bifurcation of worker identity is a relatively new 
phenomenon in employment and labor laws, one that reflects cultural shifts in 
work and state governance. Far from being a natural or necessary way to 
categorize workers, the employee and independent contractor classifications in 
work law11 arose in the post–World War II era through the application of the 
doctrine of respondeat superior to laws regulating employment and labor. 
Because of the capacious and subjective nature of the doctrine of 
respondeat superior—which courts had most commonly used to determine 
vicarious liability in the tort context—the evolving legal analysis for 
employment classification reflects not clear legal rules, but rather prevailing 
political and cultural philosophies. With the growth of free-market cultural 
ethos, broadly termed “neoliberalism,” in the 1970s and 1980s, the doctrinal 
analysis that defined the protected worker––the employee––greatly narrowed, 
undermining basic worker protections. Indeed, one of the latest embodiments 
of the doctrinal test for employment, as articulated by the D.C. Circuit in 
2009,12 reflects a particular idealization of the “entrepreneur” and the cultural 
and political philosophies of neoliberalism, typified by the idea that workers 
should be liberated by the free market and unencumbered by the state’s 
protections.13 
 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/16/uber-plaintiff-speaks-out-settlement-lawsuit 
[https://perma.cc/UQF6-SPRM]. In O’Connor, plaintiffs, a class of Uber drivers, argue that Uber 
misclassifies them as independent contractors and that they should be considered employees under 
California law. Much to the dismay of workers’ rights advocates and many objecting Uber drivers, the 
plaintiffs’ attorney, Shannon Liss-Riordan, and Uber agreed to settle the case. The court has rejected 
the terms of this contentious settlement. I represented a group of objecting drivers from a workers’ 
organization called the San Francisco Bay Area Drivers Association and filed a declaration detailing 
why the case should not be settled under the proposed terms. The declaration can be accessed here: 
http://www.uchastings.edu/news/articles/2016/05/Dubal%20Declaration%20-%20Uber.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E69V-87TG]. 
 11. I use the term work law throughout this Article to refer to laws regulating work, including 
employment and labor laws. This is a common terminological trend in the study of employment and 
labor laws. See, e.g., MARION CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2015) (the 
seminal casebook being used to teach law students employment and labor relations). 
 12. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 504 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 13. Professor Reuel Schiller documents the post–World War II shift made by courts to protect 
“individual liberties” over group rights. He describes the changes that ensued as being the byproduct 
of a broader shift in intellectual thought and argues, as I do here, that this move weakened the U.S. 
labor movement. Reuel E. Schiller, From Group Rights to Individual Liberties: Post-War Labor Law, 
Liberalism, and the Waning of Union Strength, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1–2 (1999). 
2017] WAGE SLAVE OR ENTREPRENEUR? 71 
Finally, Part III draws on findings from over two years of ethnographic 
fieldwork in the taxi worker community of San Francisco. Based on this data, I 
argue that the two legal worker categories have become meaningful not just for 
employment regulation but also for worker identities and collectivities on the 
ground. Many workers in my ethnographic study, particularly immigrant taxi 
workers, embraced their precarious independent contractor status for surprising 
reasons. White, nonmigrant taxi workers, on the other hand, longed for 
employee status, believing that the identity would not only bring security and 
stability but also professionalism and dignity back to their work.14 This 
difference in the social and cultural perceptions and realities of the diverse taxi 
workforce has greatly fractured worker collectivities within the San Francisco 
taxi industry. 
The Conclusion considers implications of these empirical findings for 
both doctrinal analysis and lawyering methodologies. In addition to proposing 
an alternative doctrinal test that may lead to more consistent employment 
classification decisions (reflecting both legislative intent and working realities), 
I argue that lawyers representing the interests of workers must be more 
attentive to the diverse goals of the workers themselves. 
I. 
WORKER IDENTITIES IN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
A central vehicle for the decline of worker protections is the shifting 
definition of who is an employee for the purposes of employment and labor 
regulation. While business representatives have worked to decrease legal and 
financial risks and liabilities by narrowing the scope of the definition of 
employee, plaintiff-side and public interest attorneys have sought to broaden 
the definition to ensure that the protections extend to more workers. Amidst 
this push and pull, the laws and tests defining who is an employee have 
perplexed both the courts and legal scholars. This Section provides a brief 
review of the contemporary doctrinal tests defining the protected employee and 
the current legal debates pertaining to the categorization of workers as either 
“employees” or “independent contractors.”15 
 
 14. For the purposes of this Article, I use “nonmigrant” to describe workers who have not 
crossed national boundaries to live and work. Many of the white, nonmigrant workers in my study 
were indeed internal migrants, having moved from another part of the United States to San Francisco. 
 15. An enormous amount of scholarship has been devoted to this area of the law, and I do not 
do justice to it all in this Section. For other seminal pieces that opine on the independent contractor 
(often referred to as a “contingent worker”) and employee distinction both domestically and 
internationally, see KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); Katherine V. W. Stone, Rethinking Labour 
Law: Employment Protection for Boundaryless Workers, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF 
LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 155 (Guy Davidov & Brian 
Langille eds., 2006); Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A 
Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 
(2003); Guy Davidov, Who Is a Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57 (2005) (analyzing use of economic 
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A. Main Doctrinal Tests 
Contemporary commentators on both sides of the debate agree on one 
thing: despite the fact that employment status matters enormously for both 
businesses and workers, the legal definitions and doctrinal tests demarcating 
the protected employee in federal, state, and municipal work laws are 
indeterminate. Three main doctrinal tests summarized below in Figure 1––or 
variations thereof––determine whether workers are employees or independent 
contractors for the purposes of different rights and protections. 
The first test, the Common Law of Agency Test, of which there are many 
variations, is the core of almost all other tests. Broadly, it examines the alleged 
employer’s “control” over the means and manner of a worker’s job 
performance to determine his status as an employee. The more control exerted 
by the alleged employer, the more likely the worker is an employee. However, 
due to the subjective nature of the analysis and the difficulty in applying the 
test across the field of work, the test’s requirements are unevenly applied and 
the concept of “control” is itself contested. 
The second test, the Economic Realities Test, is used to determine 
eligibility for wage and hour and family leave protections. This test considers 
both control and additional factors that discern the worker’s economic 
dependence on the alleged employer. In theory, under this test, the more 
economically dependent a worker is on his or her alleged employer, the more 
likely it is that the worker is an employee. For example, one factor of the 
Economic Realities Test investigates the relative financial investments of an 
alleged employee. If he does not own his own instruments of work but rather 
borrows them from the alleged employer, then that factor weighs in favor of 
employee status. 
The third test, the ABC Test, is used primarily by state administrative 
bodies to determine eligibility for unemployment insurance. This test attempts 
to simplify the analysis of control by looking at three factors: (1) whether the 
worker is free from direction or control, (2) whether the worker performs the 
work off the premises of the business, and (3) whether the worker is engaged in 
a “customarily” independent trade.16 Even under this simplified test, states vary 
as to how they weigh the factors in making their determination.17 
As a result of the various tests and the myriad factors used to determine 
employee status, the current regime of employee status and rights is piecemeal 
and inconsistent. A worker may be legally classified as an employee for 
workers’ compensation but as an independent contractor for protected 
 
dependence in U.K. wage and hour law to define a category of worker broader than employee); Jeffrey 
E. Dilger, Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain: Control as a Nonfactor in Employee 
Status Determinations Under FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 123 (2010). 
 16. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, COVERAGE 1-4 (2014), http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf 
/uilawcompar/2014/coverage.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UEH-29SU]. 
 17. Id. 
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collective bargaining.18 As Richard Carlson has argued, because of the nature 
of these tests, “[t]he real work of identifying ‘employees’ and their 
employment relationships has always been in courts . . . [b]ut the courts have 
scarcely been any more clear . . . in developing definitions or rules for this 
purpose.”19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18. For example, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) twice rejected the petition by a 
group of San Francisco taxi workers to be considered a protected bargaining unit under the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRB determined that under the NLRA analysis, the taxi workers 
were independent contractors. Luxor Cab Co. v. United Taxicab Workers, 20-RC-16314 (June 15, 
1989) (on file with author); Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. v. Chauffeurs Union Local No. 265, 20-RC-
14735 (Mar. 28, 1979) (on file with author). However, the California Superior Court later found that 
San Francisco taxi workers were employees for purposes of workers’ compensation and 
unemployment insurance. Tracy v. Yellow Cab Cooperative, No. 938786 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 
1996). 
 19. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How 
It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 298–99 (2001). 
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Figure 1: Defining “Employees” Under Federal & State Laws: An 
Approximate Summary 
 
Legal Test Dispositive Factor(s) Employment 
Protections/Benefits 
Common Law 
of Agency 
Test20  
[Alleged] Employer’s Control over 
“Means and Manner” of Worker’s 
Work21 
 
 Collective 
Bargaining 
Protection under the 
National Labor 
Relations Act 
(NLRA) 
 Protection from 
Discrimination 
under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act 
 Protection under the 
Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act 
(ADEA) 
 Protection under the 
Employee 
Retirement Income 
Security Act 
(ERISA) 
 Protection under 
State Workers’ 
Compensation Laws 
 
 20. The Restatement (Third) of Agency defines the employee as follows: “[A]n employee is an 
agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s 
performance of work.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006). 
 21. The emphasis of the “control” analysis varies and is the subject of much debate. The 
Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence set forth thirteen factors that should be 
considered under the common law control analysis: (1) the hiring party’s right to control the manner 
and means by which the product is accomplished; (2) the skill required; (3) the source of the 
instrumentalities/tools; (4) the location of the work; (5) the duration of the relationship; (6) whether the 
hiring party can assign additional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hired party’s 
discretion over when/how long to work; (8) the method of payment; (9) the hired party’s ability to 
hire/pay assistants; (10) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; (11) 
whether the hiring party is in business; (12) the provision of employee benefits; and (13) the tax 
treatment of the hired party. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989). 
While no single factor is dispositive, the primary emphasis is put on the first factor––the extent to 
which the hiring party controls the manner and means by which the worker completes her task. See id. 
at 752. 
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Economic 
Realities 
Test22 
 
 Degree of control exercised by the 
[alleged] employer; 
 Extent of the relative investments of 
the [alleged] employee/employer; 
 Degree to which the [alleged] 
employee’s opportunity for profit 
and loss is determined by the 
[alleged] employer; 
 Skill and initiative required in 
performing the job; and 
 Permanency of the relationship. 
 
 Wage and Hour 
Protections under 
the Fair Labor 
Standards Act 
(FLSA)23 
 Protections under 
the Family Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) 
 Benefits under the 
Social Security Act 
(SSA) 
ABC Test 
 
 The worker is free from control or 
direction in the performance of the 
work. 
 The work is done outside the usual 
course of the company’s business 
and off business premises. 
 The worker is customarily engaged 
in an independent trade, occupation, 
profession, or business. 
 Protection under 
State Unemployment 
Insurance Laws24 
 
 
 22. The Supreme Court in United States v. Silk, a case adjudicating employment status under 
the Social Security Act, set forth five derived factors constituting the Economic Realities Test: (1) the 
degree of control exercised by the alleged employer; (2) the extent of the relative investments of the 
alleged employer and the alleged employee; (3) the degree to which the alleged employee’s 
opportunity for profit and loss is determined by the alleged employer; (4) the skill and initiative 
required in performing the job; and (5) the permanency of the relationship. United States v. Silk, 331 
U.S. 704, 716 (1947). Several jurisdictions add a sixth factor to the inquiry: whether the service 
rendered by the individual is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. See, e.g., Dole v. 
Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 803 (10th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Superior Care, 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 
1988); Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir. 1987); Donovan v. DialAmerica 
Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1381 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985); Donovan v. 
Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 23. Most circuits use a hybrid version of the control test and the economic realities test to 
make determinations under the ADEA, Title VII, and ERISA. See, e.g., Wilde v. Cty. of Kandiyohi, 
15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994); Oestman v. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th 
Cir. 1992); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067–68 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1985); Garrett v. Phillips Mills, 
Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981–82 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37–38 (3d Cir. 
1983); Unger v. Consol. Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 915 n.8 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 
1102 (1983), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340–41 
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982); Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 
880, 883 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831–32 (6th Cir. 1979). At least one 
appellate court, the Ninth Circuit, has said that the Control Test, the Economic Realities Test, and any 
combination therein are functionally equivalent. See Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 
945 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 24. About two-thirds of states use the ABC Test to determine eligibility for unemployment 
insurance. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 16, at 15-6. 
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B. Views in the Debate 
A major fissure in the scholarly debate on the regulation of employment is 
whether it is even possible to capture, or at least closely ascertain, who is an 
employee on a consistent basis. At least one federal circuit has opined that 
“there is no functional difference between the three formulations” of tests for 
employment.25 And courts and administrative bodies have come to divergent 
conclusions, even when looking at the same set of facts. For example, in 2009, 
the D.C. Circuit, using a refined version of the common law control test, ruled 
that FedEx Home Delivery drivers were independent contractors under the 
National Labor Relations Act.26 Five years later, however, the Ninth Circuit, 
also using a variation of the common law control test, found that similarly 
situated FedEx Home Delivery drivers were employees for the purposes of 
wage protections under California law.27 
Some scholars and legal commentators look at these conflicting outcomes 
and contend that the doctrinal inquiry into employment classification needs to 
be more clearly defined, with a one-size-fits-all test for every context.28 Others 
maintain that searching for a single test in such a complexly formulated 
economy where subcontracting and multiple employers abound is a fool’s 
errand. 
Proponents who push for clearer doctrine advocate for a refined version of 
one of the three tests detailed in Figure 1. In this context, workers’ rights 
champions have generally supported a test of economic dependency, which, 
they maintain, would also mean a return to the statutory purpose of 
employment protection laws.29 Because such a test would base employment 
status entirely on a worker’s economic dependence on his or her employer, 
supporters have argued that this analysis would get to the heart of the 
classification issue: workers who need state protection or state regulation 
would get it. Sympathetic critics counter that such a test would leave too much 
 
 25. The Ninth Circuit wrote, “We take this opportunity to clarify what the district court 
ultimately recognized: there is no functional difference between the three formulations.” Murray, 613 
F.3d at 945. Eight years prior, however, the Supreme Court, in a case adjudicating the applicability of 
ERISA, maintained that the Economic Realities Test used for FLSA purposes “stretches the meaning 
of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of 
traditional agency law principles.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992). 
 26. “We have considered all the common law factors, and, on balance, are compelled to 
conclude they favor independent contractor status.” FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 
504 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 27. “We hold that plaintiffs are employees as a matter of law under California’s right-to-
control test.” Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 997 (9th Cir. 2014). 
Notably, the class action challenging the status of Uber drivers is also being litigated under California 
law. 
 28. See, e.g., Karen R. Harned et al., Creating A Workable Legal Standard for Defining an 
Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 113 (2010); Jennifer Pinsof, A New 
Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 341, 369 (2016). 
 29. See Carlson, supra note 19, at 344–45. 
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judicial discretion to determine how much economic dependence is needed to 
trigger protection. This, critics maintain, would result in inconsistent and 
unpredictable results, similar to decisions made using the economic realities 
test.30 At least one scholar reasons that under an economic dependency test, 
both quintessential small business people and workers suffering from extreme 
economic vulnerability but without a single boss (e.g., day laborers) would 
continue to be left out of the regime of protections despite facing extraordinary 
economic hardship.31 
Employers’ representatives have also endorsed their own version of a 
single standard test to offer more guidance to businesses seeking to streamline 
their structures and to avoid unnecessary liabilities—an amended version of the 
Internal Revenue Service Factors Test32 (itself an interpretation of the Common 
 
 30. See, e.g., Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor 
Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 286 (2011). 
 31. Id. 
 32. The Internal Revenue Service has identified twenty factors to aid in determining whether a 
worker falls into the employee status under the revenue codes. These factors are as follows:  
1. INSTRUCTIONS. A worker who is required to comply with other persons’ instructions 
about when, where, and how he or she is to work is ordinarily an employee . . . ;  
2. TRAINING. Training a worker by requiring an experienced employee to work with the 
worker, by corresponding with the worker, by requiring the worker to attend meetings, or 
by using other methods, indicates that the person or persons for whom the services are 
performed want the services performed in a particular method or manner;  
3. INTEGRATION. Integration of the worker’s services into the business operations 
generally shows that the worker is subject to direction and control . . . ;  
4. SERVICES RENDERED PERSONALLY. If the Services must be rendered personally, 
presumably the person or persons for whom the services are performed are interested in the 
methods used to accomplish the work as well as in the results;  
5. HIRING, SUPERVISING, AND PAYING ASSISTANTS. If the person or persons for 
whom the services are performed hire, supervise, and pay assistants, that factor generally 
shows control over the workers on the job . . . ;  
6. CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP. A continuing relationship between the worker and 
the person or persons for whom the services are performed indicates that an employer-
employee relationship exists. A continuing relationship may exist where work is performed 
at frequently recurring although irregular intervals;  
7. SET HOURS OF WORK. The establishment of set hours of work by the person or 
persons for whom the services are performed is a factor indicating control;  
8. FULL TIME REQUIRED. If the worker must devote substantially full time to the 
business of the person or persons for whom the services are performed, such person or 
persons have control over the amount of time the worker spends working and impliedly 
restrict the worker from doing other gainful work . . . ;  
9. DOING WORK ON EMPLOYER’S PREMISES. If the work is performed on the 
premises of the person or persons for whom the services are performed, that factor suggests 
control over the worker, especially if the work could be done elsewhere. Work done off the 
premises of the person or persons receiving the services, such as at the office of the worker, 
indicates some freedom from control . . . Control over the place of work is indicated when 
the person or persons for whom the services are performed have the right to compel the 
worker to travel a designated route, to canvass a territory within a certain time, or to work at 
specific places as required;  
10. ORDER OR SEQUENCE SET. If a worker must perform services in the order or 
sequence set by the person or persons for whom the services are performed, that factor 
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Law of Agency Test). However, workers’ advocates have countered that the 
proposed amendments include highly malleable criteria that employers could 
use to even further limit the coverage of employment protections. For example, 
one recommended amendment includes a condition that would favor 
independent contractor status if the worker has “performed a significant 
amount of service for others.”33 While such a standard would decrease the 
 
shows that the worker is not free to follow the worker’s own pattern of work but must 
follow the established routines and schedules of the person or persons for whom the 
services are performed . . . ;  
11. ORAL OR WRITTEN REPORTS. A requirement that the worker submit regular or 
written reports to the person or persons for whom the services are performed indicates a 
degree of control;  
12. PAYMENT BY HOUR, WEEK, MONTH. Payment by the hour, week, or month 
generally points to an employer-employee relationship, provided that this method of 
payment is not just a convenient way of paying a lump sum agreed upon as the cost of a 
job . . . ;  
13. PAYMENT OF BUSINESS AND/OR TRAVELING EXPENSES. If the person or 
persons for whom the services are performed ordinarily pay the worker’s business and/or 
traveling expenses, the worker is ordinarily an employee . . . ;  
14. FURNISHING OF TOOLS AND MATERIALS. The fact that the person or persons 
for whom the services are performed furnish significant tools, materials, and other 
equipment tends to show the existence of an employer-employee relationship;  
15. SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT. If the worker invests in facilities that are used by the 
worker in performing services and are not typically maintained by employees (such as the 
maintenance of an office rented at fair value from an unrelated party), that factor tends to 
indicate that the worker is an independent contractor . . . Special scrutiny is required with 
respect to certain types of facilities, such as home offices;  
16. REALIZATION OF PROFIT OR LOSS. A worker who can realize a profit or suffer a 
loss as a result of the worker’s services (in addition to the profit or loss ordinarily realized 
by employees) is generally an independent contractor, but the worker who cannot is an 
employee . . . ;  
17. WORKING FOR MORE THAN ONE FIRM AT A TIME. If a worker performs more 
than de minimis services for a multiple of unrelated persons or firms at the same time, that 
factor generally indicates that the worker is an independent contractor . . . ;  
18. MAKING SERVICE AVAILABLE TO GENERAL PUBLIC. The fact that a worker 
makes his or her services available to the general public on a regular and consistent basis 
indicates an independent contractor relationship;  
19. RIGHT TO DISCHARGE. The right to discharge a worker is a factor indicating that 
the worker is an employee and the person possessing the right is an employer. An employer 
exercises control through the threat of dismissal, which causes the worker to obey the 
employer’s instructions . . . ; [and]  
20. RIGHT TO TERMINATE. If the worker has the right to end his or her relationship 
with the person for whom the services are performed at any time he or she wishes without 
incurring liability, that factor indicates an employer-employee relationship. 
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (1987). 
 33. Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An 
Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
187, 220 (1999). Linder writes:  
In 1995, more than a hundred members of the House of Representatives supported the 
introduction of . . . a bill in response to demands during that year’s White House 
Conference on Small Business, whose delegates named a new definition of independent 
contractors “their number one concern.” The resulting initiative, H.R. 1972, . . . . “would 
enable employers to label workers as independent contractors” if the workers met the 
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liabilities of businesses, it would also constrict the reach of employment 
protections that are vital in addressing poverty and inequality among the 
nation’s most vulnerable workers. 
For those who promote the “no good answer” approach, enforcing 
employment and labor law means focusing solely on the actions of the alleged 
employer, rather than focusing on the interactions between the alleged 
employer and the alleged employee. Following in the scholarship of Marc 
Linder, who famously calls the dichotomy between employees and independent 
contractors “intellectually bankrupt,”34 Noah Zatz proposes that efforts to parse 
out workers’ legal identities be diverted to instead determine when a business is 
avoiding liability.35 Like many scholars, Zatz agrees that the vagueness of 
worker categorization tests incentivizes employers to drive a greater number of 
their workers into a zone of ambiguity, thereby lowering employers’ financial 
and legal risks. He argues convincingly, “legal reform should focus [not on 
refining the definitions of the employee but rather] on the process of structuring 
work relationships.”36 For example, under this framework, an employer would 
be held liable for committing unfair labor practices by shifting work to 
individual contractors when it does so to prevent liabilities like unionization.37 
This promising focus may indeed prevent worker misclassification, but it 
remains unclear how to formulate a test or judicial inquiry into the 
intentionality of business structures. Calling for such legal reform also 
sidesteps the fundamental classification question for contemporary workers and 
putative employers in a grey zone. 
This concise background on the doctrinal tests defining worker identities 
and the debates surrounding the doctrine contextualizes how work and workers 
are viewed through today’s muddled legal lens. Employment, as it turns out, is 
 
following criteria: (1) they “agree to perform the service for a particular amount of time or 
to complete a specific result and be liable for damages for early termination without cause”; 
(2) they are “not required to perform services exclusively for the service recipient,” and in 
the preceding or following year, either “performed a significant amount of service for 
others” or “offered to perform services for others through . . . individual . . . oral 
solicitations”; and (3) that “[t]he services must be performed pursuant to a written contract, 
and the contract must state that the service provider will not be treated as an employee with 
respect to such services.” Pursuant to these criteria, a firm would be entitled to label an 
unskilled migrant farmworker an independent contractor under all federal employment-
related laws merely because she: (1) agreed to work for a week or to harvest a specified 
acreage and was required by the firm to agree to pay the firm damages for leaving early 
without cause; (2) was not required to harvest exclusively for this firm and either harvested 
for other farmers or knocked on their doors and offered to do so; and, (3) signed an 
adhesion contract stating that she was not an employee. Under such radically manipulable 
criteria, the universe of covered employees would be rapidly depleted.  
Id. at 219–20. 
 34. Id. at 230. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Zatz, supra note 30, at 280. 
 37. Id. 
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not a natural social fact that is easily and clearly identifiable.38 Throughout the 
remainder of this Article, I maintain that rather than merely recognizing and 
regulating social facts, the legal adjudication of employment is both influenced 
by and influences social realities of work. Parts II and III depart from existing 
scholarship by considering how the law envisions and constitutes the social 
realities of work. In the next Section, for example, I contend that the various 
tests and arguments over factors in the doctrinal tests reflect not mere 
arguments about the law but rather reflect contesting ideologies about work and 
work politics. Because employee status tests provide a road map for future 
business models, the evolution of this case law tells a story about how courts 
and businesses have historically constituted work as a coherent social sphere. 
When and why did legally defining a worker become so tricky? 
II. 
THE PRODUCTION OF PRECARITY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL TAXI DRIVER 
This Section uses historical and legal analysis to examine the production 
of precarity—the conditions under which employment laws originally written 
to protect workers have come to engender their risky and uncertain working 
conditions. Because, as discussed in Part I, the adjudication of employment 
regulation is piecemeal, with different tests used for different employment 
rights, I focus primarily on the legal history of work law as it relates to the right 
to collectively bargain. Protected collective bargaining is the only employment 
right that is concerned with rectifying the inequalities between workers and 
businesses prior to the formation of the employment contract.39 
The legal determination of who is an employee granted the right to 
collectively bargain and of who is an independent contractor completely 
uncovered by labor protections is not a natural categorization. Rather, this 
bifurcation of worker identity is the result of recent legal history influenced by 
U.S. work politics, the rise of neoliberalism, and shifting ideas about the 
individual’s relationship to the state.40 For a growing number of workers, 
 
 38. For more information on work as a social institution, see generally CATHERINE R. 
ALBISTON, RIGHTS ON LEAVE: INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY 
AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (2010). 
 39. See Zatz, supra note 30, at 293. My research and practice experience also reveals that 
without collective bargaining, many other employment rights may become more difficult to enforce. 
For example, in San Francisco, because of misclassification litigation in the 1990s, taxi workers are 
supposed to have workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance. See, e.g., supra note 9. 
However, my research revealed that over the past twenty-five years, workers have rarely availed 
themselves of these rights out of fear of being blacklisted in the industry. Without collective power, 
workers are, or at least feel, fearful of retaliation for enforcing their individual employment rights. 
 40. Much scholarly ink has been spilled on neoliberalism. I use the term to describe two 
intersecting phenomena: (1) policies that reflect an economic practice aimed at “liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade,” and (2) hegemonic discourse in which the ideals of 
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including taxi drivers, truck drivers, delivery drivers, janitors, and nail salon 
workers, the adjudication of who receives the protections of the state is a legal 
determination reflecting not only shifting doctrine but also the growth of a free 
market cultural ethos.41 
I maintain throughout this Section that the cultural and political 
veneration of the “entrepreneur” as the ideal citizen-worker has greatly 
influenced doctrinal analysis of who constitutes a worker for the purposes of 
employment protections. The entrepreneurial actor’s emergence as the remedy 
for economic inequality alongside the decline of both employment protections 
and the welfare state is not accidental.42 Instead, it represents shifting 
perceptions about the role of the individual in relation to both work and the 
state. In the legal analysis of the D.C. Circuit, for example, the working-class 
entrepreneur has become the opposite, not of the unemployed, but of the wage-
worker, reflecting not the way businesses structure themselves to avoid 
liability, but the way that workers should behave.43 Rather than the state 
providing a “safety net” for the down and out, the worker is a “partner that 
sustains the re-orientation of the government” through his labor.44 He endures a 
low wage or income and must “pull himself up by his bootstraps” to replace the 
state’s responsibility for individual social security and employment. Rather 
than leaching off “entitlements” (including employment benefits), he must 
entrepreneurialize himself by becoming a small businessman. 
The precarious nature of work today, exemplified by the risks of working-
class entrepreneurialism and the independent contractor identity, finds its legal 
roots in the taxi industry. In the 1970s, taxi companies were among the first to 
 
individual freedom and the free market are sacrosanct. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005). I do not intend to describe neoliberalism in merely causal terms, as either 
“bottom-up” or “top-down,” but rather as a “circuitous process of socio-spatial transformation.” Simon 
Springer, Neoliberalism as Discourse: Between Foucauldian Political Economy and Marxian 
Poststructuralism, 9 CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUD. 133 (2012). In other words, neoliberal policies are 
not just pushed upon and resisted by subjugated workers, but rather, neoliberal discourse infuses 
worker understandings of their experiences and desires in relation to these policies, thereby shaping 
the possibilities of worker politics. 
 41. Throughout this Article, I focus on the taxi industry and efforts to restructure businesses 
internally to avoid the liabilities associated with employment regulation. However, many businesses, 
such as the garment and janitorial industries, evade liabilities by restructuring themselves externally, 
using complicated arrangements with judgment-proof middlemen to “employ” workers. A burgeoning 
body of literature covers this “joint employer phenomenon,” and in 2014, the NLRB General Counsel 
announced the decision to expand the standard of “joint employer” for bargaining and unionization 
purposes. This will likely affect the ability of franchisee workers to engage in protected bargaining. 
NLRB Office of the General Counsel Authorizes Complaints Against McDonald’s Franchisees and 
Determines McDonald’s, USA, LLC Is a Joint Employer, NLRB (July 29, 2014), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-authorizes-complaints-
against-mcdonalds [https://perma.cc/37K7-TD9T]. 
 42. See TOMAS MARTTILA, THE CULTURE OF ENTERPRISE IN NEOLIBERALISM: SPECTERS OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1–7 (2013). 
 43. See Fedex Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 44. MARTTILA, supra note 42, at 1. 
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reorder their business models and convert their workers from employees that 
had the right to collectively bargain to independent contractors that were 
uncovered by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the litany of New 
Deal and post–New Deal employment protections.45 The response of courts to 
the de-unionization of taxi workers endorsed the business decisions of 
companies by shifting risk onto workers and fueling the production of a new 
identity for low-income workers––that of the working-class entrepreneur.46 
Part II.A explains the broad legal, historical, and cultural contexts for the 
fall of the protected wage-earning employee and the rise of the unprotected 
independent contractor entrepreneur in work law, arguing that both legislation 
and legal decisions facilitated the formation of this precarious work. Part II.B 
then examines the impacts of these broad legal shifts on the history of the San 
Francisco taxi industry and the regulations governing both San Francisco taxi 
companies and taxi workers. Asserting that they were facilitating 
“entrepreneurialism,” courts, local regulators, and businesses enabled the 
shifting of corporate risk and responsibility onto workers who did not receive 
commensurate remuneration. 
A. From Employee to Entrepreneur Under the Law 
Not surprisingly, alongside the growth of the independent contractor 
identity, the United States has witnessed a massive reduction in union 
membership.47 The percentage of U.S. workers with the “right to collectively 
bargain” who are organized by unions and protected by the NLRA has 
decreased dramatically since the post–World War II years, from over 35 
percent in 1954 to just over 11 percent in 2013.48 In today’s deregulated, 
globalized economy, indirect employment is growing.49 Businesses rely heavily 
on the labor of subcontractors, independent contractors, and temporary 
workers, all of whom are considered ineligible for the collective bargaining 
protections of the NLRA.50 How did the majority of work in the United States 
become constructed so as to undermine work law protections? 
 
 45. As a result, in the post–Taft Hartley era, taxi companies also faced the first classification 
challenges. See, e.g., Party Cab Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1949). 
 46. See, e.g., id.; Local 777 v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1979), discussed infra. 
 47. Scholars explain the decline in private sector union membership by blaming a variety of 
factors including the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs, intense hostility from businesses, the failures 
of unions to organize the service sector industry, and decisions by courts to grow individual rights 
while limiting group rights. See, e.g., Henry S. Farber, The Decline of Unionization in the United 
States: What Can Be Learned from Recent Experience?, 8 J. LAB. ECON. (1990). 
 48. Drew Desilver, American Unions Membership Declines as Support Fluctuates, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/for-american-unions-
membership-trails-far-behind-public-support [https://perma.cc/NM2E-P6MY]. 
 49. Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (July 27, 
2005), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.toc.htm [https://perma.cc/9VSZ-XZ8D]. 
 50. Temporary workers, although independent contractors of the companies for whom they 
provide services, are sometimes “employees” of the Temporary Service Agency that connects them to 
their temporary work. For a fascinating ethnography of a Temporary Service Agency, see Emine 
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1. National Labor Relations Act and the “Employee” 
New Deal legislation, including the NLRA, protects “employees,” and not 
“independent contractors.” These identities, however, are not inherent to the 
organization of work in the United States. Rather, they are legally constructed 
definitions and the boundary between them is contested.51 Both Congress and 
the courts have fiercely debated those definitions and have changed them in 
relationship to shifting ideas and perceptions of work. Now, almost eighty 
years after the passage of the NLRA, the legal boundaries of the protected 
worker––the employee––exclude an increasing number of workers. With more 
workers laboring outside the boundaries of work law, the law’s ability to 
regulate employment is increasingly curtailed. 
How and when did workers become divided into independent contractors 
and employees for the purposes of employment and labor protections? The 
legislative history of the NLRA reflects no intention to divide workers into 
employees, who are eligible for collective bargaining, and independent 
contractors, who are cut out of its protections. To the contrary, the NLRA’s 
promulgators clearly contemplated taxi workers and other similar workers who 
would today be classified as independent contractors as intended beneficiaries 
of the NLRA. In the House Debates preceding the passage of the NLRA, 
Congressman Connery, the bill’s sponsor, stated, “We are talking about all the 
working people of the country. We say that we want all workers to have the 
right to bargain collectively.”52 To underscore the need for all workers to have 
bargaining power––even those with numerous employers or with under ten 
fellow employees—the report comparing different versions of the bill stated, 
“[i]n some industries, such as motion pictures and trucking, employee units of 
3, 2, and even 1 are not at all uncommon.”53 Understanding that the modern 
industrial organization was much more complexly constituted than a simple 
employer-employee formula, the NLRA’s architects intended a consistently- 
applied, flexible working definition of employment.54 
 
Fidan Elcioglu, Producing Precarity: The Temporary Staffing Agency in the Labor Market, 33 
QUALITATIVE SOC. 117 (2010). 
 51. Legal scholars have long argued that the “Law”––the New Deal legislation and its 
administration by courts––is more than partly responsible for the decline of organized labor. See, e.g., 
Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal 
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) (discussing the co-optation and disciplining 
of the workers’ movement by New Deal reforms). 
 52. Proceedings in H. on June 19, 1935, on Agreeing to H. Res. 263 (79 Cong. Rec. 
9683)/Debates in H. on June 19, 1935, on S. 1958 (79 Cong. Rec. 9683-9711, 9713-9730), reprinted 
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 3119 (1949) (emphasis 
added). 
 53. Mem. of Mar. 11, 1935, Prepared for S. Comm. on Educ. and Lab. Comparing S. 1958 
(74th Cong., 1st Sess.), with S. 2926 (73d Cong., 2d Sess.), as Reported with Amendments, reprinted 
in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1342 (1948). 
 54. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 122–24 (1944). 
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Even opponents of what became the NLRA did not contest the meaning of 
employee in their otherwise vociferous arguments against and suggested 
amendments to the bill. During hearings in the Senate, James Emery, the 
General Counsel of the National Association of Manufacturers, spoke 
vehemently against the bill. In particular, he objected to the provision that 
would allow striking workers to maintain their protected status as “employees” 
under the NLRA. Emery’s testimony gives the modern reader historical context 
as to who was considered an employee at the time of the NLRA’s passage. He 
protested: 
The fact [is] that at the present time . . . the city of New York has been 
thrown into civil disorder by a strike between taxicab drivers and their 
employers in which the streets of the city have been the scene of public 
disorder . . . I shall show you presently, if this bill were in effect, those 
very strikers, guilty of those very acts, would still be, within the 
contemplation of the law, “employees” of their employers . . . .55 
By using the taxi workers in his example, he situates them as workers 
historically understood as “employees” intended to benefit from the NLRA. 
Like the NLRA, most New Deal legislation providing worker protections 
used the term employee to describe the intended beneficiaries, but did not 
define the term, or only did so loosely. Businesses tried to utilize this 
definitional ambiguity to limit their liabilities and burdens under the new 
laws.56 By drawing on the unclear boundaries between independent contractors 
and employees in tort law, businesses argued that the common law of agency 
should be applied to determine who was an employee under the NLRA.57 
Notably, however, Congress did not discuss this tort law issue during the 
legislative sessions preceding the passage of the NLRA because it did not 
conceive of the dichotomy between “independent contractors” and 
“employees” in agency law as extending to employment law protections. 
Agency law originated in concerns about negligence––when to hold employers 
liable for the acts of their workers––while employment and labor laws focus on 
 
 55. Hearings before Sen. Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 73d Congress, Sec. Session, on S. 2926: 
Part II (Mar. 26–Apr. 3, 1934), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT, supra note 53. 
 56. See, e.g., Indus. Comm’n v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 553–54 (1939); 
Unemployment Comp. Comm’n of N.C. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 479, 483–87 
(1939); Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, 4 A.2d 640 (Conn. 1939). 
 57. See, e.g., Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. at 562 (“The issues made herein primarily 
center on what shall be considered ‘employment’ within the meaning of that word as used in the 
Colorado Unemployment Compensation Act. . . . The company contends that the persons involved 
herein are independent contractors; that ‘employment,’ as used in the act, relates primarily to the 
relationship of master and servant, and it is, therefore, to that extent exempt from the provisions of the 
law.”). 
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the welfare of workers.58 Extending the reasoning of the common law of 
agency to the employment regulation context was neither natural nor necessary. 
In the midst of business’ efforts to evade the burdens of a unionized 
workforce, the Supreme Court examined the case of newsboys seeking to 
unionize and collectively bargain as proscribed by the NLRA in National 
Labor Relations Board v. Hearst. There, the Court rejected the argument that 
the employee definition should be determined using the common law of 
agency.59 The Court instead found that Congress intended the NLRA to address 
labor strife broadly. Consequently, the definition of employee for purposes of 
the NLRA encompassed “a wider field than the narrow technical legal relation 
of ‘master and servant,’ as [in agency law] . . . .”60 Further, Justice Rutledge 
underscored the ambiguities between the employee and the independent 
contractor and argued that the identity of employee is not a simple truth under 
the law: 
The [employer’s] argument assumes that there is some simple, uniform 
and easily applicable test which the courts have used, in dealing with 
such problems, to determine whether persons doing work for others 
fall in one class or the other. Unfortunately this is not true. . . . Few 
problems in the law have given greater variety of application and 
conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between 
what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly 
one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.61 
Presciently, Justice Rutledge acknowledged both the need to look beyond 
the industrial factory setting and the difficulties of employing a single test to 
determine “employment” under the common law test given the emergence of 
new business structures. While the Fordist factory model of production was 
still dominant at the time of this decision, other business models that relied on 
long-term contractors, particularly in service and entertainment centers, were 
growing.62 Justice Rutledge wrote: 
Wide variations in the forms of employee self-organization and the 
complexities of modern industrial organization make difficult the use 
of inflexible rules as the test of an appropriate [bargaining] unit. 
Congress was informed of the need for flexibility in shaping the 
[bargaining] unit to the particular case and accordingly gave the Board 
wide discretion in the matter.63 
 
 58. For evidence of the origins of agency law and the doctrine of respondeat superior in 
negligence principles, see The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior, 17 HARV. L. REV. 51 (1903). 
 59. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 124. 
 60. Id. at 125. 
 61. Id. at 120–21 (emphasis added). 
 62. Joachim Singelmann, The Sectoral Transformation of the Labor Force in Seven 
Industrialized Countries, 1920–1970, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1224, 1229 (1978). 
 63. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 134 (emphasis added). 
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After the passage of the NLRA and the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hearst, the enormous consequences of the definitional boundary dividing 
workers into two categories—employees and independent contractors—became 
clear. For workers, Hearst meant that no matter the complexity of their 
employer’s business model or whether they had more than one employer, they 
could engage in protected bargaining, get social security benefits, and be 
entitled to a guaranteed minimum wage. For businesses, Hearst signaled 
increased costs and the burden of dealing with workers whose power to bargain 
augmented them from being “servants,” as the common law of agency had it, to 
being on more equal footing with their employers. Circuit courts and 
administrative bodies cited to Hearst dozens of times between 1944 and 1947, 
reflecting the great impact the decision had on workers’ rights under New Deal 
legislation.64 
Only three years after the Hearst decision, the Eightieth Congress (1947 
to 1949) unraveled many New Deal labor and employment protections. Known 
for its opposition to New Deal and Fair Deal laws, the Eightieth Congress 
aggressively passed pro-business legislation, precipitating a legal journey back 
toward precarious work. Most (in)famously, Congress passed the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA), also known as the Taft-Hartley Act and 
called the “Slave Labor Law” by its opponents.65 Rooted not only in business 
interests but also in the protection of the individual against the collective (and 
in particular, Cold War fears of the Sovietization of the American workforce), 
the LMRA broadly restricted activities of labor unions.66 
One way the LMRA addressed businesses’ concerns about the NLRA was 
through new restrictions on the NLRA’s definition of “employee.” The revised 
definition of employee did not include supervisors or independent 
contractors.67 At the time, the more controversial of these two changes was the 
 
 64. See, e.g., Duquesne Warehouse Co. v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 148 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1945), rev’d, 
326 U.S. 446 (1946); NLRB v. Norfolk S. Bus Corp., 159 F.2d 516, 517 (4th Cir. 1946); NLRB v. 
Packard Motor Car Co., 157 F.2d 80, 85 (6th Cir. 1946), aff’d, 330 U.S. 485 (1947). 
 65. Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763, 766 
(1998). 
 66. Professor of industrial and labor relations Rick Hurd details the limits that the LMRA put 
on union activity:  
The LMRA outlawed closed shops, required sixty days’ notice before a strike, required a 
non-Communist oath from all union officials, allowed states to outlaw union shops, and 
made collective bargaining contracts enforceable in the courts. The LMRA also added a list 
of unfair labor practices for labor unions, including: 1. organizing strikes, 2. jurisdictional 
strikes, 3. secondary boycotts, 4. featherbedding, 5. refusal to bargain with management. 
Finally, the LMRA set up a complex procedure to deal with ‘national emergency’ strikes; 
under this procedure, whenever the President decides that a strike endangers national health 
or safety, the strike can be enjoined by federal courts for 80 days.  
Richard W. Hurd, New Deal Labor Policy and the Containment of Radical Union Activity, 8 REV. 
RADICAL POL. ECON. 32, 29 (1976). 
 67. The LMRA’s definition of employee reads as follows:  
The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees 
of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include 
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exclusion of supervisors from the definition of employee.68 The single mention 
of the independent contractor carve out in the legislative history is in the House 
Report on the modifications, which states, in part: 
In the law, there always has been a difference, and a big difference, 
between “employees” and “independent contractors.” “Employees” 
work for wages or salaries under direct supervision. “Independent 
contractors” undertake to do a job for a price, decide how the work 
will be done, usually hire others to do the work, and depend for their 
income not upon wages, but upon the difference between what they 
paid for the goods, materials, and labor and what they receive for the 
end result, that is, upon profits.69 
The House Report rested its opposition to the Hearst decision in the 
Supreme Court’s reliance and deference to the NLRB, stating that the NLRB 
had aggressively expanded the definition beyond its common usage and that 
Congress did not intend for such an expansion.70 The legislative history of the 
 
any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any 
current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any 
other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual 
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at 
his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the 
status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any 
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C.A. 151 et 
seq.], as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as 
herein defined.  
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). The Taft-Hartley amendments’ exclusion of supervisors from the NLRA 
has received a great deal of scholarly attention and criticism for its role in undermining labor. See, e.g., 
Kenneth R. Dolin, The Supreme Court’s Rejection of Excluding “Ordinary Professional or Technical 
Judgment” as Independent Judgment When Directing Employees: Does Kentucky River Mean Lights 
out for “Mississippi Power?,” 18 LAB. LAW. 365 (2003); Ben M. Germana, Protecting Managerial 
Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (1991); Robert D. Leiter, 
Supervisory Employees and the Taft-Hartley Law, 15 S. ECON. J. 311 (1949). 
 68. 29 U.S.C § 152(3). 
 69. H.R. Rep. on H.R. 3020 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT, supra note 53, at 309. 
 70. The House Report states:  
An “employee”, according to all standard dictionaries, according to the law as the courts 
have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost everyone, with the exception of 
members of the National Labor Relations Board, means someone who works for another 
for hire. But in the case of National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 
(322 U.S. 111 (1944)), the Board expanded the definition of the term “employee” beyond 
anything that it ever had included before, and the Supreme Court, relying upon the theoretic 
“expertness” of the Board, upheld the Board. In this case the Board held independent 
merchants who bought newspapers from the publisher and hired people to sell them to be 
“employees.” The people the merchants hired to sell the papers were “employees” of the 
merchants, but holding the merchants to be “employees” of the publisher of the papers was 
most far-reaching. It must be presumed that when Congress passed the Labor Act, it 
intended the words it used to have the meanings that they had when Congress passed the 
act, not new meanings that, 9 years later, the Labor Board might think up.  
Id. 
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NLRA and Justice Rutledge’s opinion in Hearst, as discussed above, render 
these assertions questionable at best. 
The independent contractor exclusion was perhaps less controversial than 
the supervisor exclusion because much of the workforce was configured under 
an industrial model of employment. Most workers were still included within 
the abridged definition of employee, so the impact of the independent 
contractor exception was considered minor.71 Nevertheless, astute business 
lawyers noticed the potential implications of the withdrawal of independent 
contractors from the definition of employees who could collectively bargain 
and receive other employment protections. Willett H. Parr, for example, a 
business law attorney and senior partner at an Indiana law firm, summarized 
the LMRA’s importance for the Indiana Bar. He stated: 
While most people regard this section of the [LMRA] as of importance 
because of its exclusion of supervisors from the definition of 
employees, and it was important that the question be decided that way, 
I hail the independent contractor provision not only for its innate worth 
but as an indication of a return to principles of law evolved by 
experience and understood without specious reasoning.72 
Mr. Parr’s observation of the exclusion’s importance proved accurate as 
businesses, including taxi companies, restructured to limit liabilities to their 
workers and undermine their ability to collectively bargain. 
Amidst broader neoliberal economic shifts in the coming decades, 
including the outsourcing of manufacturing work and the rise of the service 
economy, businesses found ways to utilize the ambiguities of the common law 
definition of employee. In doing so, they relieved themselves of obligations to 
their workers under New Deal legislation. The importance of employer 
“control” over the means and manner of work in the common law of agency 
test to determine whether a worker was an employee gave non-factory-based 
industries incentive to streamline their business models. Taxi companies, for 
example, escaped union contracts through a practice called “leasing,” in which 
they used the common law definition of employee as a guide to convert their 
workers to independent contractors. While the nature of taxi work remained the 
same, the new business model of the taxi companies not only undermined 
worker protections but also shifted the bearing of financial risk from the 
business to the worker. 
 
 71. However, another notable type of work where workers did not fit the industrial factory 
model was homework, occupied mostly by women. According to historian Eileen Boris, homework, 
including piece-rate work in which women brought the factory or office home, blurred the division 
between public and private spheres and therefore challenged how government administrators thought 
about work and regulated it. See EILEEN BORIS, HOME TO WORK: MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS 
OF INDUSTRIAL HOMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES (1994). 
 72. Willett H. Parr, The Taft-Hartley Law, 23 IND. L.J. 12, 14–15 (1947). 
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2. Entrepreneur by Law: The Rise of Neoliberalism’s Quintessential 
Actor in Legal Reasoning 
This Section examines how and why post-LMRA court decisions 
contributed to the fall of employment and labor law protections and the rise of 
precarious work. Using the unwieldy “control test” to determine employment, 
courts struggled with analyzing nonindustrial service work, like that performed 
in the taxi industry. Beginning in the 1970s, courts further whittled down the 
definition of employee, gradually deregulating employment and idealizing the 
“entrepreneur” as a worker identity. Appellate court decisions overturned 
NLRB findings and found transportation workers seeking to unionize to be 
independent contractors, thus undermining the rights of workers to collectively 
bargain by further restricting the definitional boundary of the employee. These 
court decisions coincided with the growth of structural neoliberalism more 
broadly.73 
In contrast to prior decades when corporate activities were surrounded by 
a web of social and political constraints, the 1970s saw the growth of legal 
reasoning reflecting the neoliberal ideation. Most centrally in the realm of work 
law, courts undermined collective bargaining rights by finding that the decision 
to structure a business—such that workers became independent contractors—
was not subject to collective bargaining. Courts established that workers 
laboring under particular business orderings should behave like small 
businessmen, without the protections of the state for their economic and social 
welfare. Today, this reasoning has evolved under the D.C. Circuit, which has 
potential jurisdiction over any NLRB appeal.74 According to FedEx Home 
Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB, leasing transportation workers are not just 
“independent contractors” but working-class “entrepreneurs”—even in the 
absence of entrepreneurial activity.75 This Section concludes with analysis of 
this contemporary case, examining how neoliberalism infused the court’s 
imagination about work and how workers can and should behave when they are 
“liberated” by the free market and unencumbered by the state. 
 
 73. In describing the origins of structural neoliberal practices, Boltanski and Chiapello explain:  
[I]nterpretation of the crisis of capitalism as a crisis of Taylorism had, since the beginning 
of the 1970s, prompted a number of initiatives by employers to change the organization of 
work. . . . As early as 1980, Gerard Lyon-Caen demonstrated that the proliferation of casual 
workers was the result of new strategies on the part of firms. These strategies were 
structured around two points: a new employment policy, making it possible for the 
employer to “maintain a free hand”, and a new “policy of enterprise structures”, such that 
employers––by outsourcing manpower, for example––could “shield themselves as 
employer.” 
LUC BOLTANSKI & EVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 218–26 (2005). These precise 
shifts occurred in the taxi industry through the practice of leasing. See Chapters 2 and 3 of BIJU 
MATHEW, TAXI!: CABS AND CAPITALISM IN NEW YORK CITY (2005). 
 74. The D.C. Circuit has potential jurisdiction over any NLRB appeal because the NLRB is a 
federal board. 
 75. Supra note 23. 
90 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  105:65 
In the years following the LMRA, businesses experimented with the 
ambiguities of the employee identity. The transportation sector was an ideal 
place to push the legal boundaries because workers were not “controlled” in the 
traditional industrial sense. When the independent contractor identity of 
transportation workers was challenged, appellate courts almost invariably 
decided in favor of the companies, against both the arguments of the NLRB 
and plaintiffs’ attorneys. Control over the means and manner of production as 
required under the common law definition of the employee was, arguably, 
limited in transportation work.76 Due to the nature of driving, employers easily 
argued that they did not exert spatial or temporal influence over their workers. 
Over and over again, courts found that taxi drivers who leased their cabs were 
“independent contractors” under the common law.77 
The most cited and influential appellate decision prohibiting these lease 
cab drivers from collective bargaining is a 1979 D.C. Circuit case, Local 777, 
Democratic Union Organizing Committee, Seafarers International Union of 
North American, AFL-CIO v. NLRB (“Local 777”), which subverted workers’ 
employment protections to the decision-making prerogatives of business by 
finding lease cab drivers to be independent contractors under the common law 
analysis of control.78 Local 777 became central to the adjudication of the legal 
worker identities of lessee workers because it dealt not just with the common 
law analysis of workers in a non-industrial setting but also with the 
technicalities of the business shift to leasing. Namely, it facilitated the abolition 
of state protections in taxi employment by withdrawing the law from 
negotiated union agreements, eliminating collective worker rights.79 
Local 777 enabled leasing and shifted risk onto workers by deciding that 
the companies’ change in business model—from profiting by taking 
commissions from drivers’ earnings to profiting by leasing taxis to workers—
was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. Leasing shifted the source of the 
companies’ income from the riding public to the drivers themselves. The 
companies charged workers for use of the cab, and workers, in turn, kept their 
 
 76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d 912, 925 (11th Cir. 1983); 
Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983); City Cab Co. of Orlando, 
285 N.L.R.B. 1191, 1192 (1987). 
 77. See Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d at 925; Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis, 721 
F.2d at 366; City Cab Co. of Orlando, 285 N.L.R.B. at 1192. 
 78. Despite an elaborate analysis of why the decision of the cab companies to lease cabs to 
their drivers was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, the court states:  
[W]e prefer to rest our decision on the grounds that even if the decision to institute leasing 
was a mandatory subject of bargaining, the companies’ unilateral action [to turn to leasing] 
was not an unfair labor practice because the union itself made any negotiation impossible 
by imposing an improper condition as a prerequisite to bargaining.  
Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The 
“improper condition” that the court refers to was the union’s condition that it continue to be recognized 
as the representative of the drivers. Id. 
 79. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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fares. Drivers’ take-home income became the difference between their lease 
payment and the fares they collected. The court’s decision allowed the 
companies to evade union contracts and to unilaterally turn their drivers into 
independent contractors. The D.C. Circuit agreed that the practice of leasing 
violated the terms of the union contract, but held that the companies’ decision 
to change their source of income was not subject to collective bargaining. The 
court wrote, 
The fact that an employer’s decision affects conditions of employment 
does not necessarily imply . . . that it is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. . . . [T]he decision to lease did not merely change the 
identity of the persons employed, but rather the entire basis of the 
companies’ income.80 
Thus, even though the taxi companies in question had premeditatively 
advanced plans to make their workers independent contractors, going so far as 
to request an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling on the matter prior to the 
change,81 the court found that the switch of worker identity was within the 
realm of the business prerogative and not an unfair labor practice.82 
The D.C. Circuit panel in Local 777 also determined that under the “all of 
the circumstances” of control test––a derivative of the common law test of 
control––the drivers in question were independent contractors.83 Centrally, the 
court held that: 
[T]he extent of the actual supervision exercised by a putative employer 
over the “means and manner of the workers” performance is the most 
important element to be considered in determining whether or not one 
is dealing with independent contractors or employees.84 
Drawing on the realities of factory-based industrial work––not service or piece-
rate work––the court determined that the “right to control the physical 
movements of the employee is the most important single element” in assessing 
the “means and manner” of employer control.85 The court discounted the 
companies’ control over workers before and after their shifts and found that on 
the road the drivers did not suffer the control of a boss in their workspace.86 
 
 80. Local 777, 603 F.2d at 883–84. 
 81. Id. at 867. 
 82. Id.; see supra note 32 for the IRS test factors. 
 83. Local 777, 603 F.2d at 868. The “all of the circumstances test” finds its origins in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).  
 84. Local 777, 603 F.2d at 873 (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. at 875 (emphasis added). 
 86. In deciding that the “control” analysis was limited to the period of time during which the 
drivers were in possession of their cabs, the court cited to a 1949 case dealing with back taxes, Party 
Cab Co. v. United States, 172 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1949). The Seventh Circuit in Party Cab, however, 
found that lessee cab drivers were neither employees nor independent contractors. The Party Cab 
decision stated that “the relation between the plaintiff and the drivers appears more like some kind of a 
joint venture . . . .” Id. at 93. 
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The Local 777 decision acknowledged that even in the physical absence 
of a boss, taxi workers confronted a litany of controls over their work while 
driving, but blamed these controls on government rules, not on business 
interests. Because the taxi industry is subject to municipal regulations and 
driving is subject to motor laws, the D.C. Circuit found that the “controls” 
faced by drivers stemmed from the law, not from the companies themselves.87 
Dismissing the union’s insistence that the “companies discipline lessee drivers 
through threat of city action,” the court harkened back to the NLRB’s own 
findings that agency regulations are evidence of government––not employer––
control.88 The court wrote, “It is the law that controls the driver. . . . The effect 
of state regulation is a far cry from such restrictions as cause ‘the actor’s 
physical activities and his time (to be) surrendered to the control of the 
Master.’”89 Finally, the Local 777 court reasoned that the taxi drivers in 
question could not be employees because the lease system removed financial 
incentives for companies to control drivers: 
When a driver pays a fixed rental, regardless of his earnings on a 
particular day, and when he retains all the fares he collects without 
having to account to the company in any way, there is a strong 
inference that the cab company . . . does not exert control over “the 
means and manner” of his performance . . . [because] the company 
simply would have no financial incentive to exert control over its 
drivers.90 
In making this determination, the court ignored both nonmonetary and 
monetary incentives for control. Cab companies, for example, did have 
incentive to influence a driver’s behavior towards riders because it reflected on 
the companies’ brands. Further, the companies had a monetary incentive to 
exert control over how many fares a driver picked up during a shift because it 
determined how much the companies could charge for a lease. Municipal 
regulations required drivers to keep “trip sheets” detailing all their rides and the 
fares collected.91 The court speciously reasoned that these trip sheets “serve[d] 
no purpose” to companies under the leasing practice.92 To the contrary, the trip 
sheets were a way for the companies to gauge driver income and to hold drivers 
indirectly accountable for their revenue. Without government regulation, the 
amount of the lease was at the whim of the taxi companies. The more money a 
driver made, the higher the taxicab companies could raise the lease charge, and 
the greater the companies could profit. 
 
 87. Local 777, 603 F.2d. at 874. 
 88. Id. at 901. 
 89. Id. at 875. 
 90. Id. at 879. 
 91. Id. at 874. 
 92. Id. at 876. 
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Local 777 and the litany of misclassification decisions93 that followed its 
reasoning underscored the difficulty that courts had with analyzing “control”— 
the key test of analysis in the common law definition of employment—when 
workers were not confined to the same space as their employer or not paid an 
hourly wage, as they were in the industrial or factory setting. The Local 777 
decision found many elements of control over the “means and manner” of the 
lease cab drivers’ work, such as the required maintenance of trip sheets, but 
blamed that control on municipal regulation and discounted benefits those 
regulations provided the cab companies.94 Further, the court’s analysis of other 
forms of control was circumscribed by the assertion that under the leasing 
system, cab companies had no financial incentive to control workers. The 
inability of the D.C. Circuit to draw forth a well-defined test on whether or not 
leasing drivers were independent contractors for collective bargaining purposes 
resulted in muddled legal analysis and inconsistent decisions for many decades 
of cases to come.95 
In 2009, exactly thirty years after deciding Local 777, the D.C. Circuit 
decided another case in which the right of transportation workers to 
collectively bargain was at issue. In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, the court 
effectively discarded the “means and manner” of control test in favor of an 
“entrepreneurial potential” test for determining the employment identity of 
transportation workers. The court explained that the new test shifted the 
classification analysis “in favor of a more accurate proxy: whether the putative 
independent contractors have significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain 
or loss” under the company’s business model.96 Articulating the 
“entrepreneurial potential” test as a better formulation of the common law test, 
Judge Brown opined: 
[I]t is not “the degree of supervision under which [one] labors but . . . 
the degree to which [one] functions as an entrepreneur—that is, takes 
economic risk and has the corresponding opportunity to profit from 
working smarter, not just harder,” that better illuminates one’s 
status.97 
In reformulating the common law test, the court drew on neoliberal ideas about 
work and further narrowed the boundaries of the definition of “employee.” 
Single-route drivers for FedEx Home Delivery, the court held, could not 
 
 93. See generally Air Transit, Inc. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. 
Associated Diamond Cabs, Inc., 702 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1983); Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. 
NLRB, 721 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 94. Local 777, 603 F.2d. at 876. 
 95. See supra note 93; City Cab Co. of Orlando, Inc. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 261, 265–66 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) (finding taxi drivers to be employees); C.C.E., Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 860–61 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) (finding freight drivers were independent contractors). 
 96. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (internal quotes omitted) (citing 
Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. at 503 (emphasis added). 
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unionize under the law because the company’s business model afforded 
workers “entrepreneurial potential.”98 Specifically, FedEx outsourced hiring 
responsibilities to drivers who could hire their own employees or “sell” their 
truck and route to another worker. Instead of interpreting this as the employer’s 
abdication of duties and outsourcing of management work to workers, the court 
found that these features of the business ordering gave workers the opportunity 
to make more money. The workers’ supposed entrepreneurial opportunity, 
then, precluded the legal identity of employee and the right to collective 
bargaining. In deciding that the truck drivers were not just independent 
contractors, but also working-class “entrepreneurs,” the court went one step 
further than previous decisions. 
Notably, the court focused its analysis on potential entrepreneurial 
opportunity, not on realized entrepreneurial opportunity or practice. Here, the 
FedEx Home Delivery decision determined who is an independent contractor 
by finding inherent in the legal definition one who has the opportunity to profit 
from not just working hard, but from working “smart”––in other words, one 
who can (but may not) maximize profits during the course of one’s work––thus 
ignoring actual conditions of work and remuneration.99 By this measure, risk 
and uncertainty are interpreted as the workers’ entrepreneurial opportunity and 
potential. The court was not interested in workers’ “regular exercise of [the 
right to engage in entrepreneurial activity]” but in the “worker’s retention of 
[that] right.”100 With this emphasis, the court implicitly placed value on the 
“freedom” of the worker to entrepreneuralize himself while subverting his right 
to act collectively. The majority was not persuaded by the NLRB’s factual 
findings that the occasion for actual profit was miniscule and that the FedEx 
drivers did not actually organize their work in the form of small, independent 
businesses.101 Nor did the court find it relevant that FedEx Home Delivery 
exerted significant control over the workers’ performance––assigning routes 
requiring audits, forcing drivers to wear uniforms, requiring drivers to conform 
to grooming standards, requiring drivers to drive certain vehicles, and forcing 
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Establish Clear Rules on Categorizing ‘Independent Contractors,’ WASH. LEGAL FOUND., 
http://www.wlf.org/upload/10-24-08samp.pdf [https://perma.cc/62SH-LJYB]. 
 100. FedEx, 563 F.3d at 502 (internal quotes omitted). 
 101. Id. at 500. 
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drivers to display the FedEx logo on those vehicles (amid other things).102 
Instead, the decision discounted the controlling behaviors of FedEx and blamed 
the fact that no drivers reaped financial benefits from FedEx’s business model 
on a “fail[ure by drivers] . . . to make the extra effort.”103 
Rather than reflecting an objective reality about work, this doctrinal test 
of entrepreneurial potential reflects powerful (and shifting) cultural meanings 
about work and capitalism. Self-determination, individuality, and flexibility are 
valorized in the potentials of the working-class entrepreneur, while stability 
and security are, at best, under-considered. As neoliberalism’s “quintessential 
actor,”104 the entrepreneur and the supposed freedom, flexibility, independence, 
and creativity of their work reflect the sacrosanct ideals of deregulated, free-
enterprise governance. 
B. Driven to Precarity 
This Section builds off of the legal and regulatory shifts discussed in Part 
II.A to examine the following question: How did the application of the 
independent contractor and employee bifurcation in employment and labor 
laws affect the San Francisco taxi industry? After the passage of the LMRA 
and federal court decisions such as Local 777 relating the leasing system to 
independent contractor status, taxi companies in San Francisco restructured 
themselves to avoid the liabilities associated with collectivized employee 
workers. Both the companies and city and state regulators of the taxi industry 
in San Francisco drew on the notion and potentials of “working-class 
entrepreneurialism” to justify converting taxi workers into independent 
contractors with unstable and risk-laden work lives. 
1. From Hack to Small Businessman: The Growth of Leasing as a 
Business Model in the San Francisco Taxi Industry 
Until the 1970s, taxi drivers in the United States were largely unionized 
workers. Even prior to the passage of legalized collective bargaining under the 
NLRA, taxi drivers in San Francisco, for example, were highly organized and 
went on strike for better working conditions with some frequency.105 After the 
 
 102. Notably, these factors were important to the Ninth Circuit in determining that similarly 
situated FedEx drivers were, in fact, employees. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 
765 F.3d 981, 989–94 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 103. FedEx, 563 F.3d at 498 (emphasis added). 
 104. For more on the entrepreneur as neoliberalism’s quintessential actor, see Carla Freeman, 
The “Reputation” of Neoliberalism, 34 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 252 (2007). 
 105. When taxis first arrived in San Francisco in the early twentieth century, replacing horse-
drawn carriages, the Chauffeurs’ Union Local 265, under the direction of S.T. Dixon, rapidly 
organized drivers, using collective action to improve taxi work life. Newspaper archives reveal the 
tremendous success of the Chauffeurs’ Union in securing wages and working conditions for drivers 
through strikes, protests, and local advocacy. The first documented strike of taxi workers in San 
Francisco occurred as early as 1910 and lasted three weeks. OCCIDENT, Dec. 13, 1910, at 448 (on file 
with author). The work stoppage resulted in many concessions by taxi companies, including free 
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passage of New Deal legislation, collective organizing and bargaining 
continued unabated in the San Francisco taxi and transportation industries until 
the passage of the LMRA and the advent of the “leasing system.” As discussed 
in Part II.A, leasing as a business model restructured the industry, making 
workers “independent contractors,” or working-class entrepreneurs who bore 
the risk and responsibility of the business, without the potentials of 
corresponding earnings. 
Following the passage of the NLRA in 1935, the San Francisco 
Chauffeurs’ Union, which had organized 100 percent of the San Francisco taxi 
workforce by as early as 1910, continued successfully organizing drivers and 
staging strikes for better working conditions.106 Like taxi workers across the 
country, San Francisco drivers’ daily wage depended upon a commission-based 
system. By 1972, drivers working for the largest San Francisco taxi company, 
Yellow Cab, labored under a union contract that ensured an eight-hour 
workday, a forty-hour week, $16 per day or 50 percent commission (whichever 
was greater), roughly $54.50 in health and welfare benefits per month, four 
weeks of paid vacation, and a pension fund.107 
After the passage of the LMRA, however, the independent contractor 
exclusion to the definition of employee in the NLRA encouraged the strategic 
reordering of taxi business profit models from commission-based to leasing.108 
In the 1950s, a few taxi companies nationwide began to lease cabs to drivers.109 
However, in San Francisco in 1950, municipal regulators quickly suppressed 
leasing and declared the practice illegal and exploitative, as it violated 
regulatory rules and abandoned workers to unguaranteed wages.110 The 
Chauffeurs’ Union fined three of its members for leasing their permits and 
effectively working as employers, rather than driving the cabs themselves.111 
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Over the next twelve years, the union successfully challenged the practice of 
leasing three more times at the municipal level (1959, 1962, and 1963).112 
By the late 1970s, the leasing of medallions with monetary value by non-
workers to drivers—a once vehemently contested practice—became the 
mainstream practice of the taxi industries in many cities across the country, 
including San Francisco. This practice played a central role in the image of the 
“entrepreneurial” taxi driver.113 How did this dramatic shift in municipal 
governance occur in less than ten years? 
Yellow Cab of San Francisco, the city’s largest taxi service provider, went 
bankrupt in 1976 due to corrupt practices of its parent corporation.114 When 
Yellow Cab reopened one year later, the company surprised desperate workers 
by providing nonunion lease contracts without benefits, stating that taxi drivers 
were independent contractors, not employees.115 Other companies followed 
suit, and by 1979, the independent contractor leasing identity was ubiquitous in 
the San Francisco taxi industry.116 The pervasiveness of leasing nationally, 
propelled by appellate court decisions sanctioning the practice, and the 
desperation of a city lacking taxi service, constrained San Francisco regulators 
from intervening. 
The nationwide shift to leasing led to the eventual dissolution of union 
representation for taxi workers and the unraveling of their working conditions. 
Through the practice of leasing, taxi companies passed the risk and uncertainty 
of business to workers while avoiding the liabilities associated with having 
“employees.” In discussing the shift to taxi leasing in New York City, which 
occurred at a similar time, management professor Biju Mathew writes, 
“Leasing signifie[d], in many ways, the core neoliberal economic practice and 
its logic of shifting risk downward to those who have the least power within the 
system.”117 
Despite the precarious work engendered by the practice of leasing and the 
drivers’ subsequent legal status as “independent contractors,” taxi companies 
claimed that leasing made drivers bona fide small businessmen. Companies, 
including Yellow Cab in San Francisco, boasted that, as independent 
contractors, workers had both a new physical freedom and the potential to 
make more money than ever before.118 Though the reality of workers’ lives was 
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much more complicated, with every day a gamble, no benefits, and no 
protections, the political and legal trope of “entrepreneurialism” for workers 
became even more salient in coming decades. 
By the second decade of the twenty-first century, city and state 
transportation administrators increasingly drew on the promise of working-
class entrepreneurialism and overlooked the exploitative potentials of 
deregulation. In privatizing medallions and legalizing “Transportation Network 
Companies” (TNC) in San Francisco, for example, regulatory bodies argued 
that their decisions freed the market and liberated the “entrepreneurial 
potential” of workers. However, like the shift to leasing and independent 
contracting, both phenomena exacerbated the precarities of taxi work, pushing 
drivers further from the protections of employment status and increasing 
income instability. 
2. The Making of Working-Class Entrepreneurs: Medallion Privatization 
and the Legalization of “Transportation Network Companies” 
This Section discusses the commodification of taxi medallions in San 
Francisco and the legalization of the TNCs or “ride-sharing companies” in 
California. Both regulatory decisions produced casual, insecure work, were 
validated through the pretense of working-class entrepreneurship, and were 
devised through new business models that transferred corporate risk onto 
workers. 
Concurrent to the D.C. Circuit’s 2009 decision in FedEx Home 
Delivery119 and amidst a staggering budget deficit, regulators in San Francisco 
privatized medallions—that is, conferred monetary value upon government-
issued permits to operate a taxicab and made them transferable between private 
parties. Similar to the reasoning in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, the city’s 
validation of medallion privatization reflected the logic of neoliberalism 
manifested through the ethic of working-class entrepreneurialism. The mayor 
of San Francisco, reneging on previous promises, declared that selling 
medallions would generate much-needed revenue for the city and give drivers 
the entrepreneurial opportunity to own the cabs, again ignoring the realities of 
potential compensation.120 Many working drivers incurred hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of debt to become such “entrepreneurs”—small 
businessmen who did not just drive cabs, but “owned” them. 
Three years later, however, the value of the medallion was seriously 
threatened by the same regulators’ refusal to curtail new competition in the 
 
 119. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 120. See, e.g., Veena Dubal, Sweatshop on Wheels: Mayor Gavin Newsom’s Attempt to Pillage 
the Taxi Industry, FOG CITY J. (2009), http://www.fogcityjournal.com/wordpress/1166/sweatshops-on-
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form of ride-sharing or TNCs.121 In 2012, Uber, a technology startup, created a 
mobile application that connected passengers with private drivers. The number 
of unlicensed vehicles providing taxi services in San Francisco soon 
proliferated, severely undercutting the demand for and income of lessee taxi 
workers.122 Eventually passing special rules allowing the TNCs to operate with 
minimal oversight, state regulators pointed to the possibilities of “micro-
entrepreneurship”: without startup costs, anyone could monetize his or her own 
assets through the TNCs.123 Suddenly, the promise of “micro-entrepreneurship” 
subverted the “entrepreneurial potential” of medallion-owning taxi workers and 
the earning potential of all drivers. 
The legal and political history of the San Francisco taxi medallion and its 
“ownership,” steeped in broader shifts in the organization of labor and local 
politics, reflects the historical origins and tensions of contemporary 
privatization. The roots of the taxi medallion in San Francisco date back to the 
Great Depression, when the San Francisco Board of Supervisors (Supervisors) 
first began regulating the taxi industry with the stated purpose of protecting the 
riding public and the livelihood of workers.124 In December 1929, six years 
prior to the passage of the NLRA, the Supervisors passed an ordinance limiting 
the number of cabs and cab companies, requiring insurance for drivers, and 
protecting union labor in the case of corporate merger.125 Over time, 
medallions became the physical manifestation of government regulation. The 
government issued them based on traffic demand, and both individual owner-
drivers and cab companies held a finite number of medallions. 
Historically, scholars and labor activists have asserted that conferring 
monetary value upon medallions and allowing their sale encourages 
deregulation of the industry and artificially inflates the lease fee for taxi 
workers.126 This, they argue, makes it harder for workers to earn a living, 
introduces debt into the industry, and opens the door for corruption.127 
Explaining how the commodification of medallions has led to the exploitation 
of New York City taxi drivers, Biju Mathew writes: 
Because the medallion is also a permit that the city issues . . . it is a 
commodity whose supply is artificially curtailed. As a result, there is 
significant upward pressure on its value. As the cost of the medallion 
rises, so too does the cost of the lease, as the medallion owner pushes 
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to ensure a minimum rate of return on the medallion investment. The 
fact that this permit has been converted into private property, then, 
largely explains why the leasing structure of the New York City taxi 
industry is so exploitative . . .128 
In San Francisco, the debate over whether medallions should be privatized 
(sold by the city to individuals and companies) and transferable (able to be 
resold and bought by private actors) has been a central topic of debate in the 
industry for the past sixty years.129 In 1978, illegal medallion sales and 
allegations of political corruption prompted the Supervisors to pass a measure 
barring the transfer of medallions.130 Following a veto by the mayor, the matter 
was taken up by Supervisor Quentin Kopp, submitted to the voters, and passed 
as Proposition K in 1978.131 
Proposition K grandfathered existing medallions and established that all 
taxicab medallions were not transferable, did not have monetary value, and 
could only be issued to drivers.132 The proposition also imposed a driving 
requirement for medallion holders to ensure that only working cab drivers 
could hold medallions. Supervisor Kopp, six other Supervisors (including now 
Senator Diane Feinstein and former Supervisor Harvey Milk), and the 
Chauffeurs’ Union supported Proposition K and called it “consumer 
legislation.”133 Urging voters to vote for Proposition K, they wrote, “[i]t gives 
you, the voter, a chance to say whether the cab business should be opened up to 
stop favored taxicab companies and individuals from buying and selling cab 
permits for profit and practicing unfair competition.”134 
After 1978, cab company representatives introduced eight different 
propositions attempting to repeal or amend Proposition K to make medallions 
privatized and transferable.135 All of these propositions were voted down by 
overwhelming margins by the citizens of San Francisco.136 Then, in November 
2007, San Francisco voters passed Proposition A. This proposition concerned 
bus regulation, but included a brief provision on page thirty-six of the text 
expanding the role of the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency 
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(SFMTA) in making “taxi-related regulations” in the event that the taxi 
regulatory body, the Taxi Commission, was merged with the SFMTA.137 
Less than two years later, in March 2009, the SFMTA, by authority of a 
new ordinance, took over taxi regulation. The mayor of San Francisco held a 
press conference and announced his intention to generate millions of dollars for 
the city by privatizing medallions.138 The mayor and local regulators 
emphasized that this move was good for drivers because it gave them the 
opportunity to be small business owners, real entrepreneurs.139 Despite a long 
and arduous fight by labor activists, the SFMTA Board of Directors, amidst 
fiscal emergency, voted in favor of medallion transferability and 
privatization.140 A number of drivers scrounged up money from family, 
acquaintances, and creditors to purchase medallions, hoping, against the 
economic reality of the taxi industry, to become small business owners. An 
even greater number put their names on the long waiting list of potential 
buyers. 
In 2012, three years after dozens of taxi workers incurred over $230,000 
of debt to “own” a medallion, an investment that the regulators assured them 
was sound, new competition arrived in the form of TNCs. A global 
transportation phenomenon, TNCs like Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar began as 
venture-funded startups that connected passengers with vehicles for hire via 
mobile applications. The drivers of these vehicles, who most commonly use 
their own private vehicles, are “independent contractors” who receive a certain 
percentage of profit from each fare.141 Due to the low startup costs for TNC 
drivers, who are not subject to regulatory fees and do not pay for training, as 
taxi workers do, workers flocked to become independent contractors for the 
TNCs. Both the TNCs and their supporters claimed that their services benefited 
not just the riding public but also the drivers who had entrepreneurial potential, 
flexibility in setting their hours, and no boss. 
The TNCs passed not just the financial risks, but also the legal risks onto 
worker drivers by operating without the regulatory permission of the California 
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), which oversees limousines, or the 
SFMTA, which then regulated taxis. Though the SFMTA and the CPUC 
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initially issued cease and desist orders to the companies, arguing that they were 
not properly licensed, the orders were never enforced, and the TNCs continued 
operations unabated.142 At the outset, companies maintained that they were not 
technically transportation companies, since they were not providing vehicles to 
the independent contractor drivers. Instead, they argued that they were software 
companies and therefore not regulated by the CPUC or the SFMTA. The 
companies asserted that while the drivers may have been operating illegally, 
they, as software companies, were not in violation of the law.143 
Despite great protest by taxi companies, who could no longer fill their 
shifts, and taxi workers, who could not earn a living with the unbridled 
competition, the CPUC legalized TNCs in 2013.144 Because these startups 
began in San Francisco, the CPUC was the first state regulatory body 
nationwide to respond.145 The rules passed by the CPUC allowed drivers to 
remain unlicensed and to outsource their regulatory responsibilities to the 
TNCs. The CPUC decision to allow the TNCs to operate without interruption 
and to create new, lax rules just for them has affected other states’ and cities’ 
responses as well. 
TNCs and their supporters, including government regulators, have 
claimed that this casual work helps people in a difficult economy become 
“micro-entrepreneurs”—“self-employed” drivers with a flexible schedule 
(Images 1 and 2). Media commentators, too, have noted that unlike taxi drivers, 
Lyft and Uber drivers using their own vehicles can act as “micro-
entrepreneurs.”146  
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Image 1: On a billboard in San Francisco, Lyft advertises the 
potentials of flexible work: “Nine to Five.”  
 
 
The ten-hour workday for taxi workers in San Francisco was 
accomplished through union representation. With unbridled competition, in 
order for a TNC driver or taxi worker in San Francisco to make a living wage 
in the post-union economy, he or she must work for longer. 
 
 
Image 2147: In attracting drivers, Lyft advertises that workers can be 
their own boss, appealing to the social capital of entrepreneurship and the 
desires for freedom and flexibility. 
 
What these claims to working-class entrepreneurship do not consider, 
however, is the precarious nature of the work created through a combination of 
the TNCs’ business models and the CPUC’s decision to only minimally 
regulate TNCs. Though the number of cabs is directly curtailed by the sum 
total of medallions issued by the SFMTA, the number of TNC vehicles 
operating simultaneously has no limit. With thousands of TNC vehicles 
flooding the streets, the ratio of workers to rides has increased exponentially. 
As a result, the ability of both TNC workers and taxi workers to earn a living 
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by driving is undermined. The impact on taxi workers has been drastic; in 
2014, taxi drivers reported a 65 percent decrease in their already low 
ridership.148 The ability of TNC drivers to earn a living is also limited, 
especially with rate cuts. As independent contractors, TNC drivers remain 
unprotected and uncovered by employment protections, including the minimum 
wage and recourse for unlawful termination. Uber drivers can even be “fired” 
or “suspended” by Uber when disconcerted riders give them a low rating or 
lodge complaints.149 
Meanwhile, the value of the taxi medallions purchased in 2009 has 
diminished, as has the “entrepreneurial potential” of thousands of San 
Francisco cab drivers, including the many who invested hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in a medallion.150 
III. 
RESPONDING TO AND EXPERIENCING PRECARITY: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC 
ANALYSIS OF LEGAL WORKER IDENTITIES 
In Parts I and II, I examined the historical origins of the bifurcation 
between employee and independent contractor in U.S. work law and argued 
that the doctrinal analysis determining employee status has come to reflect 
contemporary cultural and political philosophies, not on-the-ground work 
realities. Using the San Francisco taxi industry as my case study, I also showed 
how legal and regulatory trends toward growing the independent contractor 
category and narrowing the employee category have contributed to the rise of 
casual, unstable, and precarious work in the United States. With these 
backgrounds in mind, Part III turns to an ethnographic examination of San 
Francisco taxi workers’ experiences and understandings of their legal worker 
identity. While being an independent contractor puts more legal and financial 
risks on taxi workers, how do the workers themselves make sense of their 
independent contractor label, and how do these meanings affect potential 
collective action and lawyering on their behalf? 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers and public interest lawyers have long assumed that 
workers would rather be employees than independent contractors, particularly 
in low-income sectors of work. However, from 2002 to 2009, San Francisco 
taxi drivers had the opportunity to become employees if only a simple majority 
 
 148. Megan Garber, After Uber San Francisco Has Seen a 65% Decrease in Cab Use, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/what-uber-is-
doing-to-cabs-in-san-francisco-in-1-crazy-chart/380378 [https://perma.cc/2BES-9X2Q]. 
 149. Indeed, TNC drivers across the nation, including San Francisco, have organized to protest 
the lax regulatory rules and capricious company policies that govern their work and impede on their 
ability to make a living. 
 150. As of May 2016, the city of San Francisco had a list of 766 medallion-holders seeking to 
sell their medallions. That last grew from 500 in December 2015. Peter Kirby, San Francisco’s 
Medallion Program and the Damage Done, S.F. EXAMINER (May 1, 2016), http://www.sfexaminer 
.com/san-franciscos-medallion-program-damage-done [https://perma.cc/778M-XN8Q]. 
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of drivers voted to be considered employees under the law.151 And yet, despite 
workers’ rights advocacy and campaigns, this did not happen. This Section is 
aimed at understanding why this change did not occur through an examination 
of the employee and independent contractor legal categories in the lives of the 
diverse contemporary taxi workforce in San Francisco. 
In my two years of ethnographic research on San Francisco taxi workers, I 
found that the legal worker categories of independent contractor and employee 
are a prevailing feature of social and political relations between and among taxi 
drivers. For the white, nonmigrant drivers in my study, discussed in Part III.A, 
the employee identity is key to better working conditions and symbolizes a 
glorious labor history that immigrant taxi drivers cannot comprehend.152 
However, Part III.B describes how, in sharp contrast, for most immigrant and 
racial-minority drivers, the stigma and difficulties of taxi work are reinforced 
by legal and cultural discourses about the “employee.” Surprisingly, immigrant 
taxi workers value their independent contractor status because of the structural 
control it enables, physical freedom it allows, and the promises of social 
mobility engendered by the “entrepreneur” identity. I conclude that the 
multiple and sometimes contradictory nature of the law’s meanings in the lives 
of the taxi workers in my study inhibits the creation of a collective worker 
consciousness and sustained collectivities in the diverse San Francisco taxi 
workforce. 
A. Views from the Stage: Driver-Advocates & the “Return” Narrative 
The United Taxicab Workers (UTW), run by volunteer taxi drivers, was 
the longest-running post-union labor organization representing the interests of 
rank-and-file taxi workers in San Francisco.153 UTW was formed in 1986 
following the dissolution of the Chauffeurs’ Union; almost thirty years later, in 
late 2014, the UTW was subsumed by the San Francisco Taxi Worker 
Alliance.154 During its long tenure, the organization earned its reputation as the 
 
 151. See S.F. POLICE CODE § 1124.5 (2016). It is unclear how the city intended to force 
companies to reorganize themselves and, in fact, whether such an act would be legal, but nevertheless 
this is what the regulation said. 
 152. I conducted ten in-depth interviews with white, nonmigrant drivers and thirty-five in-depth 
interviews with immigrant and racial minority drivers. This roughly represents the breakdown in the 
industry. Of my ten white, nonmigrant interviewees, all of them lamented the loss of their employee 
status. This was in stark contrast to the thirty-five immigrant and racial-minority drivers who I 
interviewed. Of these drivers, only two wanted to be considered employees. The rest embraced their 
independent contractor identity. In the course of my ethnographic research, I interacted with hundreds 
of drivers of all backgrounds. The findings from my in-depth interviews reflected and were reinforced 
by the realities I observed through participant observation and everyday conversations with workers. 
 153. The UTW represented all taxi drivers but, by design, only non-medallion holding taxi 
drivers could hold positions in the organization. Medallion holding drivers, according to the UTW 
advocates, often have different interests than non-medallion holding drivers. In fact, medallion holders 
have their own representative organization, the Medallion Holders’ Association. 
 154. In November 2014, in response to the industry threat posed by the TNCs, taxi workers 
from a number of different groups (most of which had splintered from UTW) agreed to put their 
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voice of taxi workers through sustained policy advocacy and the quarterly 
publication of United to Win, an award-winning worker-centered newsletter. 
San Francisco Supervisors, taxi regulators, and the local media turned to UTW 
for the “worker perspective.”155 The composition of UTW membership was 
confidential, but those driver-advocates who were most active during my study 
were older, white, nonmigrant taxi workers, some of whom drove in the 1970s, 
prior to the conversion of drivers from employees to independent contractors. 
UTW had many victories, but its most weighty failure was its inability to 
organize workers around the employee issue. The NLRB rejected UTW’s 
petition to be considered the collective bargaining unit for taxi workers in both 
1989 and 1991, concluding that taxi workers in San Francisco were 
independent contractors under the NLRA.156 However, as a result of UTW 
advocacy, San Francisco municipal code for many years mandated that taxi 
workers be considered employees if a simple majority of drivers voted for the 
status. Notwithstanding campaigns and petitions to that end, UTW never 
achieved employee status for San Francisco taxi workers. 
Despite these repeated failures, many UTW driver-advocates continued to 
organize their understanding of the difficult working conditions in the taxi 
industry around the loss of employee status. The primarily white, nonmigrant 
UTW driver-advocates had a sophisticated understanding of the legal, 
historical, and political underpinnings of their worker identities. They blamed 
both the oppressive working conditions and the perceived marginality of taxi 
work on their independent contractor identities, and they deployed a “return” 
narrative in their advocacy. For these drivers, a “return” to employee status 
would have reinstilled taxi work with the dignity and professionalism that it 
lost when it descended from being middle-class work to becoming an 
“immigrant job” (in the words of more than one of my interviewees). However, 
their fixation on returning to an earlier moment in labor and taxi history 
became an impediment to collective action. UTW driver-advocates conceived 
of immigrant workers as nonorganizable because of their “misperceptions” and 
“illusions” about the independent contractor identity. This perception 
intensified divisions in the diverse taxi worker community. 
 
differences aside and come together under the name San Francisco Taxi Workers Alliance (SFTWA). 
The formation of the SFTWA was facilitated through and by an organizer from the National Taxi 
Workers Alliance (NTWA). The NTWA became affiliated with the AFL-CIO in 2011. National Taxi 
Workers Alliance Affiliates with the AFL-CIO, AFLCIO (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.aflcio.org/Press-
Room/Press-Releases/National-Taxi-Workers-Alliance-Affiliates-with-the [https://perma.cc/F5Q5-
ZFC6]. At the time of publishing, the most active UTW advocates remain active in the SFTWA. 
 155. During my fieldwork, most newspaper articles covering issues affecting San Francisco taxi 
drivers included commentary from UTW. 
 156. See supra note 18. 
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1. UTW Driver-Advocates on the Loss of Employee Status 
My research findings show that the views of white, nonmigrant taxi 
worker advocates affiliated with or formerly affiliated with the UTW on the 
“employee” status issue impacted the social relations among drivers and the 
political possibilities of collective action. For UTW advocates, the employee 
status held the resolution to the dilemmas and difficulties of taxi work. They 
harbored a frustration that more drivers did not want to “return” to the 
employee status, signifying, for them, an era of relative labor stability. 
Every white, nonmigrant taxi worker in my interview study attributed 
their poor working conditions to their loss of employee status. For example, 
Robin Goodings,157 a female taxi worker who has been driving in San 
Francisco since 1973, reflected on her four years as a member of the 
Chauffeurs’ Union Local 265: 
When I started driving, we were considered employees. . . . Everybody 
had health care, everybody had optical, everybody had dental, 
everybody had paid sick and vacation days. [Laughs] You remember 
them? Everybody had retirement.158 
Goodings complained that, because they are independent contractors, “[n]o one 
cares about taxi workers.”159 She pointed out that working conditions were 
better for bus drivers, who were city employees with union representation. 
When a riled San Francisco Supervisor once told Goodings that taxi workers 
were “the problem that will not go away,” she highlighted her frustration with 
the independent contractor status, urging him to return taxi workers to the 
employee status. She told him: 
You can make us go away––make us employees––what you see are 
contract negotiations happening in public. We have to negotiate every 
f*cking thing in our universe in public with the politicians and in the 
ballot box because we can’t have a union because we can’t have a 
contract because we are so-called “independent contractors.”160 
Tom Morrison, a former president of UTW from 2008 to 2010, who drove 
a taxi in San Francisco for nearly a decade, also had a keen awareness of the 
structural changes that plagued contemporary workers in the United States. He 
explained: 
The taxi drivers are really very representative of the modern situation 
with workers. Whereas in the twentieth century workers were able to 
win the point that we had skills that we brought to the marketplace that 
were worth money, that has been reversed. Now as independent 
 
 157. All names of interview subjects have been changed to protect their identities. 
 158. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Robin Goodings, Taxi Worker and UTW Advocate, in S.F., 
Cal. (Aug. 7, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Robin Goodings, Taxi Worker and UTW Advocate, in S.F., 
Cal. (Aug. 14, 2013). 
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contractors, you have to bid––you know, it’s the companies that have 
the jobs and you have to bid for these jobs and even pay for these jobs. 
Cab drivers have to pay to get into this job, and you have to pay every 
day to keep it!161 
In addition to the financial difficulties engendered by the independent 
contractor identity, white, nonmigrant drivers explained that their status as 
drivers “who have to pay” to keep their jobs also precluded other aspects of 
life. They argued that being independent contractors forced them and other taxi 
drivers to work so hard and so long that they struggled to find partners and to 
have families. Even driving full time, these drivers complained, they had to 
find other ways to supplement their income. They believed strongly that 
deregulation of the industry made taxi work a “marginal” job and that a return 
to the employee identity would reinstill taxi work with dignity and 
professionalism. Morrison, for example, stated: 
So many drivers don’t have families. They don’t even have any 
women, you know. It consumes everything. . . . Your day consists of 
racing through the day trying to make money, looking for people, 
constantly “where’s the money” and then you have to hurry up and 
recreate, to unwind, which means drinking. And then you have to 
hurry up and go to sleep so you can get up in the morning.162 
To make ends meet, many white, nonmigrant drivers told me that they 
were forced to behave as working-class entrepreneurs, acting creatively to 
supplement their full-time taxi work. Rather than embracing this 
“entrepreneur” identity, they resented it. Tom Morrison said, “You have to 
bleed this turnip dry.”163 So, not only did he make money driving his cab but he 
also thought up several other moneymaking schemes. He acted as a “roving” 
notary public, created laminated taxi licenses for other taxi drivers, and married 
people in his cab, advertising it as a quirky San Francisco experience (Image 
3). George Lawson, another former UTW President, felt forced to become a 
small-time entrepreneur in order to make ends meet as a taxi driver.164 He 
started making and selling tomato sauce and created a cab application for 
smartphones.165 Robin Goodings also “entrepreneurialized” herself to make 
ends meet. Goodings’ health problems made it increasingly difficult to be 
mobile and to drive fulltime. To supplement her driving income and to help pay 
her hefty out-of-pocket health insurance, Goodings opened a taxi driver 
institute in the UTW office as an alternative to the taxi class offered by the 
 
 161. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Tom Morrison, Taxi Worker and UTW Chairman, in 
Berkeley, Cal. (Jan. 15, 2012). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Tom Morrison, Taxi Worker and UTW Chairman, in S.F., 
Cal. (Sept. 9, 2011). 
 164. Interview by V.B. Dubal with George Lawson, Taxi Worker and UTW Chairman, in S.F., 
Cal. (Sept. 2, 2011). 
 165. Id. 
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police department. UTW driver-advocates begrudged the stress and the 
pressure to supplement their income after working more than fifty-hour weeks 
as cab drivers. 
 
Image 3: Tom Morrison supplemented his income from taxi driving 
with his work as a “roving notary public” and a minister who would 
marry couples in his cab. Morrison’s online advertisement for “marry me 
in a cab” said: “Universal Life Church minister offers quintessential SF 
wedding . . . by cab! As fun as it is, it’s not a joke. Possibilities are wide 
open . . . Let’s talk. P.S. Also available for absolution. Sliding scale.” 
 
 
2. UTW Driver-Advocates on Organizing Diverse Taxi Workers 
The law, in the form of the dual worker identities of employee and 
independent contractor, reinscribes assumptions and “common sense” 
knowledge about immigrant workers. For UTW driver-advocates, the fact that 
most immigrant taxi workers embraced their independent contractor identity 
buttressed stereotypes about the difficulties of organizing immigrants.166 In 
turn, these white, nonmigrant drivers spurned the possibility of organizing taxi 
workers collectively and focused their energies on policy advocacy that did not 
require forming collective power or consensus among the diverse workforce. 
Though UTW driver-advocates felt strongly about returning to the 
employee status, they struggled with organizing the broader taxi worker 
community around the idea. In the early 2000s, the UTW led a major campaign 
to gather signatures from a simple majority of taxi workers expressing the 
desire to be “employees” in order to convert worker status under municipal 
law. Despite the failure of this campaign, new UTW leadership returned again 
and again to the idea of organizing workers to “return” to employee status. 
 
 166. Notably, other taxi worker “unions” with diverse taxi worker populations have 
successfully organized drivers. These include the New York Taxi Workers Alliance and the 
Philadelphia Taxi Workers Alliance. 
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When a renewed attempt failed, UTW driver-advocates would blame it on 
immigrant drivers’ faith in the “illusion” of the independent contractor status. 
In 2008, for example, when Tom Morrison became president of UTW, his 
first major campaign was to convince workers that they should be employees. 
To this end, he put together a conference to educate taxi workers on the 
independent contractor status (Image 4). Despite days of outreach and flyering 
about the event, only fourteen drivers attended the conference, most of 
whom—all except one woman and one immigrant man—were older, white, 
nonmigrant men already in favor of the switch to employee status. Those who 
came genuinely curious expressed fear that being an employee meant that they 
would have to wear a uniform and could not stop to take a break when they 
wanted. 
 
Image 4: The UTW flier advertising the educational event on the 
difference between independent contractors and employees advises 
potential attendees, “Kill the rumors [about being an employee]. Learn the 
facts. Know Your Rights.” The intimation is that drivers misconceive what 
it means to be an independent contractor versus an employee. 
 
Despite the failure of the conference, Morrison soldiered on, firmly 
believing that the solution to the contemporary problems of labor was to turn 
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back the clock to an earlier decade of U.S. labor history. He felt that a return to 
the employee status was the solution to the taxi labor problem generally and to 
his problems specifically. Although Morrison never successfully organized 
workers en mass around the idea, he employed a number of attorneys to 
research the possibility and even reached out to Teamsters to see if they were 
interested in an organizing drive.167 
Throughout his tenure as UTW president, Morrison, like others, remained 
flummoxed by the nonrecognition of other taxi drivers that they should be 
employees. In an interview two years after he left UTW, frustrated by his 
inability to make change, Morrison reflected on the fact that those active in 
UTW were largely white activists and on the difficulties in organizing: 
I don’t know that we tried to go out and organize with [the immigrant 
drivers] . . . . [T]hat was a real failing, that we never bridged that gap 
across the different nationalities. . . . But, you know, when it comes 
down to it, to actually get people to come to any kind of meeting or to 
do anything, you just are really beating your head against a brick 
wall.168 
Morrison wasn’t the only former President of UTW who felt organizing 
taxi drivers was impossible. When I asked George Lawson, who was President 
of UTW from 2007 to 2008, why UTW had never been able to organize drivers 
in a sustained way, he said: 
It’s like herding cats. It’s a culture of cab drivers is everybody is 
against everybody . . . we have drivers who really believe that they are 
actually entrepreneurs, businessmen, which is B.S., but they believe it. 
It’s an illusion. If you’re an independent contractor, you could make 
yourself believe you’re a businessperson, but you’re not. There’s no 
option for growing. There’s no option to make your own business 
decisions. There’s nothing like that . . . I thought it would be possible 
to organize them, but under the current structure, I don’t think it’s 
possible.169 
George Lawson, like Tom Morrison, had a clear legal understanding of what it 
meant to be an independent contractor. He attributed the fact that drivers 
remained contractors to their false beliefs and hopes about the independent 
contractor status. He called it “an illusion.” 
Robin Goodings, too, like many UTW leaders, reflected on the difficulties 
in organizing the influx of immigrant workers in the industry. In an opinion 
piece, Goodings wrote: 
[I]t is generally hard to organize first generation immigrants. Part of 
 
 167. Although this never came to fruition, had the Teamsters decided to organize taxi workers, 
a “turf” issue between unions may have ensued since the Communication Workers of America is 
formally affiliated with the UTW. 
 168. Interview with Tom Morrison, supra note 163. 
 169. Interview by V.B. Dubal with George Lawson, S.F. Taxi Worker, in Oakland, Cal. (Jan. 
13, 2011) (emphasis added). 
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the problem stems from the fact that immigrants are generally coming 
from a less industrialized culture to more industrialized cultures. These 
less industrialized culture[s] tend to have very different social 
structures. . . . It is hard for new immigrants to perceive what the 
change is and means. . . . Most third world drivers come from areas 
where there either was no union, or else the union was just another part 
of a corrupt, repressive hierarchy.170 
To the contrary, however, my ethnographic research at regulatory hearings 
revealed that immigrant drivers did some of the most robust organizing of 
workers in the industry.171 Nevertheless, white, nonmigrant taxi worker 
advocates were unable to garner their collective power, because, as I argue in 
the next Section, they discounted the views and desires of the majority of the 
immigrant workforce. 
B. Views from the Street: Immigrant and Racial-Minority Taxi Workers 
on Freedom, Marginality, and the Independent Contractor Identity 
Unlike white, nonmigrant workers, immigrant and racial-minority drivers 
in my research perceived a gap between the promises of employee status and 
its realities. They shared the views of the UTW drivers discussed in Part III.A 
that driving was an oppressive and precarious job. But, the immigrant and 
racial-minority drivers did not blame that oppression and precarity on their 
legal identities as independent contractors. Rather, they blamed corruption, 
racism, poor regulation, and the public perception of cab drivers. The 
immigrant drivers in my research explained that the employee status would 
exacerbate, rather than disrupt, the difficulties of their work. Namely, though 
many drivers recognized the potential stability of being an employee, the status 
made them feel more out of control of their everyday lives. In addition, the 
employee status concretized the power dynamics that they worked so hard to 
escape. More than a mere “illusion,” immigrant and racial-minority drivers’ 
approval of their independent contractor status enabled them to exert control 
over their bodies, to manage their time and transnational lives, and to affirm 
their sense of dignity as working-class men.172 
 
 170. Robin Goodings, Organizing Taxi Workers (1986) (unpublished paper, San Francisco 
State University) (on file with author and the San Francisco State Labor Archives). 
 171. I would frequently hear about important regulatory hearings from UTW organizers. 
Attending the meetings, I would find immigrant workers unaffiliated with UTW on the steps of City 
Hall with signs, protesting proposed regulatory decisions. The immigrant workers would stand in line 
to have their voices heard during public comment. I would see them pouring out of the offices of San 
Francisco Supervisors where they were making their voices heard. While UTW advocates engaged 
robustly in all of these capacities, they rarely, if ever, had the number of workers behind them as the 
unaffiliated, loosely-organized immigrant workers did. 
 172. Although three of the white, nonmigrant drivers I interviewed were women, I did not 
interview any immigrant women. I approached two immigrant women for an interview, but both were 
hesitant to share their views. 
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1. Immigrant & Racial-Minority Drivers on the Marginality of Taxi Work 
Arjun Malhi, an undocumented Indian driver who has been driving a taxi 
in San Francisco since 2007, eloquently articulated the trials and travails of 
being an immigrant taxi worker, sharing the racism, corruption, and 
humiliation he faces on a daily basis. He also expressed his skepticism about 
legal recourse broadly: 
Taxi drivers aren’t respected like other drivers––like garbage truck 
drivers or MUNI [bus] drivers. If a bus driver needs anything, a PCO 
[parking control officer] will help. If a taxi driver needs help, the PCO 
will threaten the driver with a ticket. I have had this experience myself. 
I wrote a complaint. But nothing came of it. . . . And the companies––
they are corrupt and rip off drivers. . . . Taxi driving is a low level job. 
You don’t have a voice. You’re no one––especially immigrant drivers. 
All cab drivers agree that we’re looked down upon among all the 
driving jobs. We are the least respected. No one flips a finger at a 
garbage truck driver. . . . I call 9-11 a lot––whenever I see an accident, 
an emergency on the road, debris on the highway. But once, when I 
called because I was in trouble, they wouldn’t help me. I called 
because a customer was screaming at me and being abusive. The 
policeman took the customer’s word for it. It was useless. Even when I 
took the taxi class [run by the police department], the officer who 
taught it was very disrespectful to everyone. Once he showed us some 
deodorant, and he said, “They don’t even sell this in your country.”173 
Malhi’s narrative closely reflects the experiences and sentiments of other 
immigrant drivers in my research. In addition to enduring the economic 
instability articulated by the white, nonmigrant drivers in my study, all of the 
immigrant and racial-minority drivers encountered the indignities of racism at 
the hands of customers, management, and police. Complaints about 
management were particularly pronounced. Immigrant drivers complained that 
taxi management commented on their accents, their bodily smells, their 
religious identities, and their perceived countries of origin. One day-lease 
driver named Farouk said that he had such a bad experience at the first taxi 
company where he worked that when he left to go to another, he changed his 
name to “Frank” to avoid being identified as Muslim.174 Another driver, a 
Pakistani immigrant, explained that when taxi management asked him where 
he was from, he answered “India” because he was told by other drivers that 
discrimination against Pakistani immigrants would result in getting bad shifts 
or no shift at all.175 Other immigrant taxi workers sensed that taxi management 
forced them to wait hours for their car, take poor shifts, or drive broken-down 
 
 173. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Arjun Malhi, Taxi Worker, in S.F., Cal. (Jan. 24, 2012). 
 174. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Farouk Ali, S.F. Taxi Worker, in San Mateo, Cal. (Feb. 22, 
2012). 
 175. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Ahmed Sayed, Taxi Worker, in S.F., Cal. (Mar. 12, 2012). 
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taxis because of prejudices against them as a result of their national origin, 
race, or religion. 
These humiliating encounters, according to the immigrant taxi workers, 
could not be fixed by the employee status, but only further exacerbated by it. 
They feared that being legally considered employees would put them even 
further under the thumb of the cab company management who would then have 
the power to determine the condition of the taxis they drove, to force them to 
wear uniforms, to cut their hair a certain way (a concern articulated by 
observant Muslim and Sikh drivers), and to prevent them from taking breaks at 
will. As one immigrant driver rationalized, “We are already like the slaves of 
the city. If we became employees, it would be worse. [The companies] would 
tell us what to wear and where to be.”176 Given the difficulties of proving 
discrimination in the employment context, their attitudes were not illogical. 
The immigrant workers’ concerns about company control over driver 
dress and appearance were ubiquitous, but many white, nonmigrant taxi 
workers were skeptical of these anxieties, given the economic issues at stake. 
One UTW advocate, for example, had an indignant response; he told me, 
“What are they afraid of? The company is going to make them wear dresses?” 
Historical research, however, revealed that worker appearance had long been a 
meaningful issue among drivers, especially minority drivers, and one that even 
pitted them against the union in the 1970s.177 
In contrast to the nostalgia of white, nonmigrant drivers who labored with 
union representation in the 1970s, the few immigrant drivers in my study who 
drove as employees under the Chauffeurs’ Union contract remember the union 
with scorn. Samuel Tesfaye, for example, who has been driving a taxi in San 
Francisco since 1969 and claims that he was the first African immigrant driver 
in the industry, said about his time as an employee driver: 
ST: They collected our money and that was it. They could care less 
about us. Nobody cares about taxi drivers anyway. 
VD: Were things better then when the union was in place than they are 
now? 
ST: No. We didn’t know anything better back then. . . . It was tough 
and nobody really cared to begin with. We were and are looked upon 
like we’re cheap, dirt. It’s like we are the lowest. People really don’t 
 
 176. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Ashok Agarwal, Taxi Worker, in S.F., Cal. (Mar. 1, 2012). 
 177. In 1970, Yellow Cab disciplined twenty-seven drivers for “failing to meet a company 
requirement that beards be neatly trimmed and that hair not fall below collar length.” Taxi-Hair Issue 
Put in Kagel Hands, S.F. EXAMINER (Apr. 17, 1970) (on file with author). The Local 265 Union 
president supported Yellow Cab stating that the company “being a private firm, has the right under the 
contract to demand a neat and clean appearance.” Id. In response, about one hundred long-haired 
drivers, among them racial minorities, formed a “Dissident Drivers” committee and converged upon 
the Union claiming that it was conspiring with Yellow Cab. Long-Hairs Assail Cabbies’ Union, S.F. 
EXAMINER (Apr. 13, 1970) (on file with author). 
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give a heck about cab drivers today or back then.178 
Unlike Tesfaye, most immigrant drivers were excited about the prospect 
of an independent contractor union, but did not believe that achieving union 
status under the law was worth losing their independent contractor identity and 
the benefits that they perceived came with it.179 
2. Immigrant & Racial-Minority Drivers on Dignity, Control, and 
Independent Contracting 
Rather than being a result of an “illusion” about independence, immigrant 
and racial-minority drivers’ affinity for their independent contractor identity 
derives, in part, from valid concerns about control over their lives and dignity 
at work. 
One prominent way in which the immigrant drivers in my study asserted 
their allegiance to the independent contractor identity was their preference for 
the practice of long-term leasing. Many immigrant drivers attributed the 
insecurities and indignities of taxi work to the practice of day-leasing, an 
outgrowth of taxi workers’ former status as employees. As employee drivers, 
taxi workers would come into the company garage on the day of their allocated 
shifts, be given cars to drive, and then return the cars to the company garages, 
with commission earnings, at the end of their shifts. When companies 
converted drivers to independent contractors, the shift practice continued in the 
form of day-leasing. Today, day-lease drivers come into the garage on the day 
of their shift, pay the cab company to lease the car, and return the car at the end 
of their shift, keeping all earnings from the day’s work. Long-term 
leaseholders, on the other hand, only have to go to the company garage once 
every few months, if that. They escape the everyday indignities associated with 
going into the garage and encountering “the boss,” while also having more 
control over their work schedule. 
Eyasu Bekele, a fifty-two-year-old father of two who arrived in the San 
Francisco Bay Area in the early 1980s as an asylum-seeker from Ethiopia and 
who is now a long-term lease driver, repeatedly told me that when he was a 
day-lease driver, he “had no liberty” and “felt out of control”: 
The hardest part used to be like just going to work and not being able 
to go out immediately. Because once you’re on the street, everything is 
in your control. But it used to be like you go out [to the company 
garage], you stand in line, you wait. You have to bribe the guy. All 
 
 178. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Samuel Tesfaye, Taxi Worker, in Oakland, Cal. (May 23, 
2012). 
 179. While the U.S. labor force is increasingly forming independent contractor unions, these 
collective groups are not protected collective bargaining units under the law. Indeed, they risk antitrust 
liabilities in organizing as independent contractors. For more about the “worker centers” that have 
formed from this organizing, see JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT 
THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006). 
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sorts of things happening. You feel like the old defeated self kind of 
thing. You are waiting out there, and they’re [the company men] in full 
control. We have no liberty. So even the money doesn’t matter [if you 
bribe them]. They don’t like you, forget it.180 
Govind Kalra, an Indian immigrant driver who has been driving in San 
Francisco for over thirty years, echoed Bekele: 
I changed it to long-term lease because I could work for longer, and I 
had more freedom. I’m ready when I’m ready. I didn’t have to go to 
company, pay kick back. There is much more freedom as a long-term 
lease driver. If you are a gas and gates driver, you go to the cab 
company for your shift, you wait three hours to get a car. You are 
scheduled to drive for ten hours a day, but the cab is not ready when 
it’s supposed to be—not until 9:30am when it’s supposed to be ready 
at 6:30am. You lose those three hours to make money. Then, you tip 
the guy $5, you get an old car. You tip him $10, you get a better car. 
You tip him $20, you get a new car. You have to tip the gas-man, the 
dispatcher, it goes on. The long-term lease avoids all of this. . . . Long-
term lease is better. It’s like that.181 
Mohamed Iqbal, a Pakistani immigrant driver and prominent worker 
activist, said he spoke on behalf of all immigrant drivers on the long-term lease 
issue: “These people [who choose to drive under a long-term lease] don’t want 
to come in and wait in that kind of line [where you have to bribe people] and be 
insulted. People have been insulted to the limit.”182 
Past UTW leaders and other labor advocates see the employee status as a 
fix to the uncertainties faced by day-lease drivers (who may or may not 
actually get a car during their allocated shift). These advocates have fought 
against long-term leasing because of its exploitative potential.183 UTW leaders 
argued that long-term leasing places more risk on the backs of workers who 
 
 180. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Eyasu Bekele, Taxi Worker, in San Ramon, Cal. (Mar. 10, 
2012) (emphasis added). 
 181. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Govind Kalra, Taxi Worker, in S.F., Cal. (Mar. 6, 2012). 
 182. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Mohamed Iqbal, Taxi Worker, S.F., Cal. (Mar. 3, 2012) 
(emphasis added). 
 183. In the December 1986/1987 issue of The Hack Sheet, a precursor to the United Taxicab 
Workers’ quarterly newsletter, the beginnings of the use of the long-term lease is documented. The 
newsletter states:  
Rumor has it that the “independent contractor” monster has given birth to a mutant 
offspring. Pacific Cab is releasing its longtime weekly lease drivers. In order to maintain a 
working relationship with this outfit, one has to sign a lease on a monthly basis. The lease 
stipulates that only one driver may use the cab. The price–a large down payment and $2500 
per month. Oh yes, the driver must buy the vehicle and pay for repairs. More to come on 
this latest outrage.  
HACK SHEET, Dec. 1986–Jan. 1987, at 3 (on file with author). United to Win, the United Taxicab 
Workers quarterly newsletter, explained in its Winter 1996–1997 newsletter that long-term leasing “is 
a disaster for drivers and the public for several reasons . . . .” The newsletter goes on to cite loss of 
driver protections, loss of cab-driver jobs, and safety issues arising from drivers working fourteen to 
sixteen hour shifts. UNITED TO WIN, Winter 1996–1997, at 3, 8 (on file with author). 
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have to maintain the vehicles. They asserted that long-term leasing exacerbates 
the possibility of unjust working conditions for subleasing drivers who drive 
(sometimes illegally) for the long-term leaseholders. Labor advocates have also 
pointed out, correctly, that long-term leasing as a practice pushes drivers 
further from employee status. If the cab company is leasing to taxi workers 
who only come into the garage once every few months or not at all, then 
analysis of the workers’ legal classification under common law control test—
the test most commonly used to determine employment status—weighs toward 
independent contractor status.184 
However, the immigrant workers I interviewed overwhelmingly favored 
the long-term leasing practice because it helped them to take charge of their 
own bodies and lives while avoiding the anxieties that accompany the difficult 
and often racist encounters with managers in the taxi company garages. Bekele, 
for example, admitted to me that now, as a long-term lease driver, when he 
goes out onto the street, he might not make any money, but he still feels like he 
is in control.185 
In addition, some immigrant drivers argued that long-term leasing gave 
them the flexibility to deal with their family lives. As one non-medallion 
holding driver, an immigrant from China who has been driving a taxi in San 
Francisco for over twenty years, told me: 
Long-term lease always better because you always get the same cab, 
same location, no later than the fixed time. In cab company . . . you 
have to wait for a long time. . . . [With] long-term lease you can 
manage better with the private stuff. I can take my daughter to school. 
I help with my brother’s family. It make hard life easier. When my 
mother died, I [was] able to lease cab to my friend so I could attend 
funeral [in China].186 
Thus, while long-term leasing as a business practice pushed workers 
further from employee status and arguably exacerbated potential exploitation of 
sublessees, immigrant drivers in my study preferred it. They valued the 
flexibility it gave them to deal with their transnational lives and the fact that it 
allowed them to avoid the painful everyday encounters with management that 
made them feel like, in Bekele’s words, “the old defeated self kind of thing.”187 
3. Immigrant and Racial-Minority Drivers on Freedom, 
Entrepreneurship, and Independent Contracting 
When drivers stated how difficult and precarious their work was, and how 
they used to be an accountant or an engineer or a lawyer, I asked, “Why stay a 
driver, then?” 
 
 184. See supra Part I.A and accompanying discussion. 
 185. See Interview with Eyasu Bekele, supra note 180. 
 186. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Lin Wong, Taxi Worker, in S.F., Cal. (Mar. 16, 2012). 
 187. See Interview with Eyasu Bekele, supra note 180. 
118 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  105:65 
Strikingly, every driver gave the same answer, “I like the freedom.” In 
addition to embracing the structural control and flexibility enabled by 
independent contracting, many immigrant and racial-minority drivers 
experienced the independent contractor identity as a freeing identity. They 
corresponded the independent contractor identity to a freedom of the body and 
simultaneously recognized that it authorized their status as “entrepreneurs.” In 
contrast to the white, nonmigrant drivers, immigrant and racial-minority drivers 
embraced their status as working-class entrepreneurs and used it to recapture 
their dignity and reframe themselves as something more than “just a worker.” 
Though the freedom that the immigrant drivers described was emotional 
and physical––expressly not neoliberal—it was enabled by their subjective 
construction of the identity of independent contractor. Jitendra Saini, a long-
time taxi driver and immigrant from India, told me that prior to becoming a taxi 
driver, he had worked in a gas station, and prior to that, as a busboy in a 
restaurant. He explained why, though his income was less stable, he chose to 
stay a taxi driver: 
I just took the [taxi] job because it gave me more freedom . . . than the 
gas station. In India, it’s very different. There are no 9-5 jobs. People 
have their own businesses. People are not working for big corporations 
where someone else is telling them this and that and how to do work. 
For me, working like that was unnatural. . . . So, I figured taxi driving 
would be good. Whether I worked five hours, six hours, or ten hours, 
the company did not care. . . . Now, I tell my family I drive my own 
taxi, they are proud. No shame in it.188 
More than a mere “illusion,” Saini’s independent contractor status enabled 
him to exert control over his body, manage his own time, and affirm his 
dignity. Although his observation that people do not participate in wage work 
in India is empirically false,189 Saini’s own middle-class origins and immigrant 
status made wage work feel shameful. Driving his own taxi, he could claim the 
cultural status of a businessman and shrug off the potential shame of being a 
low-wage worker. Saini could proudly tell his father that, like his brothers in 
India, he was an entrepreneur. 
Ashfaq Swapan, another immigrant driver, underscored the complicity 
between the physical “freedom” of taxi driving (alluded to by Saini and other 
drivers) and the independent contractor identity: 
AS: As a driver, nobody tells you what to do. You can take a break any 
time. It’s tough, but good––even fun at times. Driving a taxi, no one is 
sitting on my back. It’s also more responsibility in comparison to other 
 
 188. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Jitendra Saini, Taxi Worker, in S.F., Cal. (Aug. 3, 2011) 
(emphasis added). 
 189. For a discussion of wage labor and minimum wage laws in India as compared to other 
countries in the Global South, see, for example, Uma Rani, et al., Minimum Wage Coverage and 
Compliance in Developing Countries, 152 INT’L LAB. REV. 381 (2013). 
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jobs. When I was a waiter, I served people food. As a taxi driver, I’m 
navigating San Francisco streets. My customer’s lives are in my hands 
as I take them from place to place. I am handling a weapon. 
VD: [Laughing] That must feel powerful! 
AS: Yes, I have a lot of power. I have to speed from stop to stop to get 
customers to even make my gate [daily lease fee]. That’s stressful, but 
it can be thrilling. This city has an energy––when I came here, after 
traveling all over the U.S.––I knew I wanted to stay. And driving, you 
feel that. You speed through it.190 
Swapan draws on power-laden imagery to describe the affective thrill of 
taxi driving, calling his cab a “weapon.” He describes his job in terms of its 
“responsibility” and “power” and closely aligns these tropes with his status as 
an independent contractor. When I asked him if he would ever want drivers to 
be employees, he answered: 
I like the small business, entrepreneurial spirit. I don’t mean to brag, 
but mostly customers say that I am the best driver they’ve had. Being 
an immigrant, I’ve made an effort to learn the language. American is 
different from Indian English. The customers say I’m very nice, kind, 
and helpful. I offer good customer service. This is my business 
practice. I run my own business. We are already like the slaves of the 
city. If we became employees, it would be worse. [The taxi 
companies] would tell us what to wear and where to be. We couldn’t 
stop and get coffee, like I am doing right now with you. We would 
lose our freedom. Drivers don’t want to lose that. It’s all we have.191 
Here, Swapan again evokes the word “freedom” to describe being free 
from the oppression of being an employee––of having one’s body submitted to 
the control of bosses, of having to wear a uniform, of being told what to do. 
Drivers, according to Swapan, are already “slaves of the city,” but they have 
the freedom of imagining and aspiring towards something else––towards an 
identity that carries them beyond that of wage-slaves towards the symbolic 
capital of “entrepreneurship.” 
Unlike the white, nonmigrant drivers I interviewed, Saini and Swapan 
(and almost all the immigrant and racial-minority drivers in my research), did 
not see their status as small businessmen as mythical or as an illusion. Rather, 
considering all the difficulties of their work, being small businessmen was all 
they had. It gave them a respectful identity in a job where they were largely 
disrespected. In a world where being a “worker”—particularly a wageworker—
is no longer respectable, being an entrepreneur, however materially 
meaningless, enables a sense of agency, a symbolic hook from which to hang 
one’s dignity. 
 
 190. Interview by V.B. Dubal with Ashfaq Swapan, Taxi Worker, in S.F., Cal. (Mar. 14, 2012). 
 191. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Immigrant drivers in my research wanted to be independent contractors 
not because they espoused a false sense of what it would mean to be an 
employee, but rather because they labor in a world where being an employee is 
immobilizing. Being “free” and “flexible” are not false tropes; they are the only 
available feelings of liberation in an industry where the screws are so tight that 
being in “control” of one’s own destiny on a day-to-day basis is beyond a 
worker’s grasp. Stopping to get coffee, as Swapan pointed out,192 or “not 
working” as another driver explained, are small acts of escape from the 
oppression of everyday life. This means that even though they might not make 
money in the end of the day, they are in control of their own bodies––or as 
Swapan puts it, of their own movement193 and the movement of their 
customers. 
Taxi worker advocates affiliated with UTW worked long and hard to 
bring stability, security, and the living wage back to the taxi profession by 
advocating for the employee legal identity. However, for immigrant and racial-
minority taxi workers, being an independent contractor reaffirmed their 
otherwise lost senses of control, freedom, and power, legally enabling an 
aspirational identity as an “entrepreneur.”194 
My interlocutors’ accounts of their driving experiences expose how the 
volitional mobility of the free, cab-driving entrepreneur relieves the coerced 
immobility of the working-class immigrant. Their desire for upward social 
mobility, while stifled by lack of real capital, is emancipated, in part, through 
the legal validation of their identities as independent contractor 
“entrepreneurs,” as opposed to employee “wage-slaves.” 
CONCLUSION 
A worker is a worker. 
—Bhairavi Desai, Executive Director of the New York Taxi Workers’ 
Alliance (which represents taxi and TNC workers) & First Member of the 
Executive Council of the AFL-CIO representing Independent Contractor 
Workers 
 
As inequality rises,195 scholars across disciplines are interested in the 
insecurity of work facilitated by what Jacob Hacker calls “the Great Risk 
Shift.”196 How and why are workers in the new economy bearing the legal and 
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 194. In my Ph.D. dissertation, I argued that taxi drivers “manage” not only their own bodies but 
also the bodies of their customers––often businessmen, entrepreneurs, and executives who sit at the 
center of global economic power. 
 195. For an economic analysis of income inequality in the United States, see Thomas Piketty & 
Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2003). 
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financial risks once shouldered by corporations?197 This Article answers a 
central part of this question by tracing the origins of the worker categories of 
employee and independent contractor in work law, their role in the production 
of worker precarity, and their part in fracturing a contemporary labor 
movement.198 I show how in the mid-to late-twentieth century, taxi companies 
used the independent contractor category to shift the legal and economic risks 
of business from government and employers to individual drivers. These 
changes have profoundly shaped the lives and opportunities of vulnerable 
workers today by rendering precarious their work. Corporate transformations in 
the taxi industry, I maintain, typify the restructuring of work in the new 
economy. This is perhaps most salient for independent contractor labor in the 
growing “gig” or “platform” economy, which use technology to proliferate 
contingent work.199  
Although the employee and independent contractor are now 
commonsense worker categories, my findings reveal that their entrée into the 
legal lexicon of employment regulations is relatively recent. Rather than being 
a necessary or natural classification, the legal binary reflects neoliberal cultural 
and political trends and ideologies—particularly, the veneration of the 
working-class entrepreneur. The response of legal advocates has been to work 
within the dualism by growing the employee category. My ethnographic 
investigation, however, exposes how many workers—particularly immigrant 
and racial-minority men—have compelling reasons to feel affection for their 
independent contractor identities. 
By revealing the contested meanings of these categories, this Article 
challenges conventional knowledge about the dualism of legal worker 
categories in political mobilization and worker movements. I show how the 
employee and the independent contractor have emerged as factious identities 
and highlight the difficult tensions between how the law understands workers 
 
 197. The “new economy” is a result of the growth of service work and the decline of 
manufacturing work in the United States and Western Europe. Accompanying this shift has been 
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twenty-first century, these relationships have “fissured.” Weil writes that in the new economy, 
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of smaller business units.” Id. at 8; see also STEVEN HILL, RAW DEAL: HOW THE “UBER ECONOMY” 
AND RUNAWAY CAPITALISM ARE SCREWING AMERICAN WORKERS (2015). 
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hiring practices in a postindustrial and shifting economy.” SMITH, supra note 197, at 4. 
 199. Legal scholars are just beginning to grapple with the “gig” or “platform” economy. The 
bulk of this Article shows how much of what is happening in the “gig” economy is not new, but a 
continuation and proliferation (via technology) of earlier business models.  
122 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  105:65 
and how workers understand themselves.200 While San Francisco taxi workers 
fought for better working conditions before the advent of Uber and Lyft, the 
powerful social and political meanings of employee and independent contractor 
splintered worker mobilization. Centrally, I reveal how and why many 
immigrant and racial-minority drivers eschewed the employee identity—in 
spite of all its apparent promise.201 
Taking seriously the call to do more than “emphasize . . . the limits of past 
legal strategies” like misclassification litigation,202 I maintain that my findings 
have real implications both for doctrinal analysis and for the strategies of 
workers’ advocates. Most centrally, the tension between the employee and 
independent contractor categories is a calling to work outside traditional 
boundaries of employment and labor regulations and to overcome the recently 
established constraints and limitations of the law. Doctrinally, one possibility 
for advocating on behalf of workers who desire employee status is to develop 
the “entrepreneurial” idealization of courts and to force it to live up to its 
claims. This means transforming the “entrepreneurial potential” test of the D.C. 
Circuit into a test of “entrepreneurial realization” rooted in the traditional 
common law of agency analysis. Under such analysis, only real financial 
remuneration from the theoretical entrepreneurial opportunity of business 
models would carve workers out of the protections of the law. 
But how do public interest lawyers and other rights advocates serve 
workers, like those taxi drivers in this Article, who reject the employee identity 
altogether? The friction between the available legal tools and the desires of a 
diverse workforce demands that advocates revolutionize their approaches. 
Collaborations between workers, their organizers, and their attorneys should 
serve the needs as the workers themselves define them. In this context, work 
law attorneys may be forced to lawyer in arenas otherwise unfamiliar to 
 
 200. Although I do not explicitly reference “legal consciousness,” my conceptual analysis owes 
a great debt to the works of Sally Engle Merry, Patricia Ewick, Susan Silbey, and Austin Sarat, who 
influenced my thinking about subjectivity and legality. Merry defines “legal consciousness” as “the 
ways people understand and use the law.” SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING 
EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); see also Patricia 
Ewick & Susan S Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account of Legal 
Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731 (1991); Austin Sarat, “ . . . The Law Is All Over”: Power, 
Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990). 
 201. My research on this meaning-making draws on and owes a great deal to the seminal 
sociolegal literature on the role of rights and legal mobilization in political struggle. In thinking about 
these issues, I was particularly influenced by the works of Michael McCann, Gerald Rosenberg, and 
Stuart Scheingold, who pioneered research on the role of rights lawyering in social movements. See 
MICHAEL W MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL 
MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD N ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (2d ed. 2004). 
 202. MCCANN, supra note 201, at 310. 
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them.203 Advocacy on behalf of taxi workers, for example, may involve 
engaging antitrust laws, regulatory laws, unfair competition laws, and even 
corporate laws. While perhaps a daunting task for lawyers trained in the 
traditional arts of employment and labor law, confronting and creatively 
targeting both private and public entities requires taking seriously the legal and 
social claim that such workers are “small business” people. 
Innovative lawyering outside the employee paradigm does not necessarily 
mean a retreat from the hard fought wins of the New Deal and labor 
movements. To the contrary, lawyering methodologies to upset the entrenched 
legal, political, and social assumptions of the employee and independent 
contractor dualism may unearth the original visions of early twentieth century 
labor struggles by acknowledging that a “worker is a worker.” Public interest 
lawyers can make this recognition in their advocacy and meet the immediate 
needs of workers while reshaping the legal possibilities of workers’ rights 
efforts. By undermining the schismatic impact of binary worker identities, 
advocates may augment the potential of worker collectivities and help to 
achieve some economic justice amidst otherwise growing economic inequality. 
My hope is that the legal, historical, and ethnographic research and 
findings rendered herein destabilize, however slightly, the dualism of legal 
worker identities and compel new visions and approaches to achieving fairness 
and equality for workers in the modern labor movement. 
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